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Abstract
TIMOTHY J. MOORE: Applications of Game Theory to Topics in Political
Economy.
(Under the direction of Peter Norman.)
In the first chapter, Political Business Cycles with Policy Compromise, I consider a dynamic
model of political decision-making where policy decisions are the result of bargaining between
two political parties. The focus of this paper is on how unobservable actions by parties (e.g.,
the whip encourages certain voting behavior in private strategy sessions) generate inefficient
political business cycles. The paper supposes that parties place a high value on future policy
outcomes and considers the set of (constrained) surplus-maximizing equilibria. As the future
surplus, or government budget, to be divided amongst the parties is stochastically determined
by parties’ hidden actions, a moral hazard problem arises. Due to this moral hazard problem,
any constrained surplus-maximizing equilibria is necessarily inefficient. Furthermore, if efforts
towards cooperation are complementary, constrained surplus-maximizing equilibria generate
policy outcomes that exhibit political cycles. This result therefore provides a rationale for
political business cycles in an environment where cooperative, patient parties negotiate policy.
In the second chapter, Gridlocks, Extreme Policies, and the Proximity of an Upcoming Election,
I analyze how the proximity of an upcoming election affects the path of policy proposals
before that election. Policy outcomes before an election date depend on the proximity of this
election date and on current and discounted expected future political power. When there
is a common expectation that policy outcomes immediately after the election will generate
high social surplus, phases of legislative gridlock, where agreement is infeasible, will either
be nonexistent or occur immediately before the election. When the distribution of political
power is highly asymmetric, implemented policies favor the party with higher power. When
the distribution of power is fairly symmetric, implemented policies can favor either party and
intervals of disagreement, and thus legislative gridlock, often occur more frequently.
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1 Political Business Cycles with Policy Compromise
1.1 Introduction
The literature on political business cycles argues that the election cycle affects policy outcomes.
This hypothesis is based on the idea that once political considerations, such as a party’s desire
to be in power or to implement policies that are consistent with its views, are taken into
account, elections influence policy decisions. Empirical analysis supports the notion that there
is a relationship between the election cycle and fluctuations in policy variables, citing evidence
of cycles in government budget deficits (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini, 1992; Shi and Svensson,
2006), tax policy (Persson and Tabellini, 2003), and economic growth (Drazen, 2000).
In representative democracies where policy decisions are made by a legislature, negotiations
amongst political parties determine policy outcomes and the nature of political business cycles.
When considering legislative policy-making, the policies that emerge are not only a function of
the observable actions that parties take (e.g., attending legislative hearings, writing legislation,
or voting on a proposed bill), but also the result of parties’ actions that are unobservable or
“hidden.” For instance, often in legislatures such as the United States Congress, private
strategy sessions amongst the members of a party occur multiple times a week. A specific
example of these meetings are the party lunches amongst members of the US Senate that
often occur Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of each week. Similarly, in the UK Parliament
or the US Congress, the party leadership, such as the whip, will have private conversations
with members of the party to encourage certain voting behavior or attendance at important
policy debates. These private meetings amongst the members of a party often shape the
party’s stance on particular issues, and hence, influence the policy outcomes that result from
negotiations between political parties.
I develop a dynamic model that considers how parties’ hidden action choices affect policy
outcomes and ultimately generate inefficient political business cycles. I consider the set of
policies that maximize welfare while also being consistent with equilibrium behavior. I find
that in these “constrained” surplus-maximizing equilibria, due to the hidden nature of parties’
actions, political cycles can arise. This result suggests that even when parties engage in
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cooperation, with efforts at bipartisanship, inefficient political cycles can emerge.
The existing literature that focuses on how negotiations between political parties produce
political cycles (Alesina, 1987) or policy distortions (Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski, 2010)
demonstrates that in constrained efficient equilibria, political cycles or distortions are largely
insignificant if parties’ actions are observable and parties place a high value on future policy
outcomes (i.e., parties have high discount factors). My paper therefore complements this
literature by showing that, in an environment where parties take hidden actions that influence
policy outcomes, even when parties are arbitrarily patient and coordinate on a constrained
surplus-maximizing equilibrium, inefficient political cycles can emerge. Thus, with patient
parties, political cycles are not only consistent with the notion of myopic political parties that
choose policies that are only optimal from a short-run perspective. Indeed, political cycles can
even be generated by strategies that aim to maximize expected welfare.
I model government policy-making as an infinite-horizon game played by two political
parties. Each period, one party is “in power,” where the evolution of political power is taken
as given and political power may change hands every other period. At the beginning of
each period, the party in power determines how the government budget should be allocated
between two public projects, where each party has a preferred project and receives no payoff
from spending on the other’s preferred project. In the same period, after this allocation
decision has been made, parties simultaneously choose an action (“investment effort”) that
stochastically affects economic growth, where higher growth means, in expectation, a larger
government budget in the future. This action choice has two key features. One, each party’s
choice is unobservable to the other party. Two, when making this choice, a party faces a
tradeoff between securing itself a high benefit today or generating a large government budget
tomorrow. Given any pair of investment efforts, there is a common expectation amongst parties
regarding the expected size of tomorrow’s budget. The identity of the party in power, the size
of the government budget, and the allocation of that budget are all commonly known.
I consider political business cycles in the expected size of the government budget. In any
surplus-maximizing policy, parties efforts towards cooperation are time-invariant. This implies
that, in expectation, the size of the government budget will be identical across periods. Hence,
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in any surplus-maximizing policy, there are no cyclical fluctuations in the size of the budget or
in parties’ investment efforts. Political cycles are therefore necessarily inefficient in the model.
Inefficient political cycles surface in constrained surplus-maximizing equilibria as the un-
observable effort choice creates a moral hazard problem (the game is one of imperfect public
monitoring). As parties’ efforts today stochastically determine the size of the budget tomor-
row, if a party observes a small government budget at the beginning of the period, it cannot be
sure if this is due to a bad shock to the economy or to the other party focusing its efforts not
on future growth, but on its own interests.1 The nature of cooperation, whether in the form
of parties sacrificing current partisan objectives for the sake of budget growth or through the
party in power implementing more equitable divisions of the budget, is affected by the severity
of this moral hazard problem. This is best illustrated by considering a variant of the model
where the investment effort is observable. If parties are sufficiently patient, it is possible to
construct an equilibrium that sustains the surplus-maximizing policy. In this equilibrium, by
simply threatening to revert to a “bad” equilibrium with low payoffs in the event that a party
deviates to a non surplus-maximizing effort choice. In contrast, when effort is unobservable,
such a strategy will no longer work as it is not possible to observe when deviations have oc-
curred. Cooperation on “good” policies each period is therefore more difficult to sustain and
inefficient policy outcomes, and hence political cycles, can arise.
The main result of the paper establishes that, if parties’ efforts toward cooperation are com-
plimentary, constrained surplus-maximizing equilibria display political cycles. These strategies
are based on the idea that nontrivial intertemportal incentives can be used to enforce certain
effort levels, where parties are “punished” or “rewarded” based on whatever information is
publicly available about parties’ past effort choices. In my model, this implies that the future
payoffs (the punishments and rewards) that parties receive must be conditioned on the size of
the government budget that is realized at the beginning of a period. Consider a constrained
surplus-maximizing equilibrium where both parties must choose to exert high effort in order
1Note that if the pair of investment choices today determined, with probability one, the size of the budget
tomorrow, each party would be able to figure out exactly what the effort choice of the other party was, and
there would be no moral hazard problem.
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to maximize aggregate surplus. In order to provide parties with an incentive to put aside
partisan differences and choose high effort levels, the equilibrium must use strategies where
“bad”, or low, realizations of the budget trigger a reversion to a punishment phase where
both parties receive a low payoff. In this punishment phase, the size of the government bud-
get is, in expectation, inefficiently low. Furthermore, the budget can exhibit high frequency
cyclical fluctuations where the budget is, in expectation, smaller immediately after an elec-
tion, compared to the budget in the middle of the term. Hence, it is possible for constrained
surplus-maximizing equilibria to exhibit political cycles.
I now discuss some features of my approach. In the model, political parties cannot make
any binding commitments to either future allocations or investment efforts. Hence, the only
constraint on policies at any date is that they are consistent with parties acting rationally
given the current state of the environment (i.e., the date, which party is in power, and the
size of the budget) and any information about past play. Regarding the notion of a political
party, though parties disagree on how to allocate the budget, they share a common view
regarding what generates budget growth. If one considers a party as a group from the same
geographically-defined district, the model is consistent with the idea that parties compete to
secure funding for local public goods (e.g., local infrastructure and parks), but agree on what
types of investments stimulate budget growth. Alternatively, one can consider parties with
ideological differences that compete to secure funding for “pet projects” (e.g., farm subsidies,
museums, local public goods), and while they may disagree in general on what investments
stimulate growth, there is agreement on a subset of investment policies (e.g., tax reform and
education) that foster growth.
Two features of the investment effort choice deserve further attention. First, the assump-
tion concerning the tradeoff parties face (i.e., securing immediate benefits today or increasing
the expected size of future budgets) captures the idea that a party can focus attention on
legislation that may either favor the party directly, through an immediate payoff, or indirectly,
through higher economic growth, and thus, a larger expected future budget. For instance, a
party can focus attention on gathering support for legislation that is loaded with pork-barrel
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spending or on legislation that invests in national infrastructure, where this investment in-
creases productivity, and thus the pool of taxable income. Likewise, a party can work towards
passing legislation that includes tax breaks and subsidies for the group it represents, or on tax
code reform that generates higher government revenues directly, or indirectly by increasing
productivity, and hence increasing the national tax base. Second, the assumption that each
party’s effort choice is unobservable to the other party is consistent with the ideas discussed
earlier. Policy outcomes, and specifically budget growth, are often influenced by the unob-
servable actions that parties take during the policy-making process, whether during the whip
process, in small committee meetings or in partisan strategy sessions. If parties are unwilling
to engage in the bipartisan cooperation that is required for “good” policies, then wasteful
programs will persist and budget-growing policies, such as a tax code free of loopholes and
credits, will fail to be implemented.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature
in greater detail. The model is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 considers surplus-maximizing
policies and constrained surplus-maximizing equilibria under perfect monitoring. Section 5
considers constrained surplus-maximizing equilibria under imperfect public monitoring. Fi-
nally, Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains omitted proofs.
1.2 Related Literature
Broadly speaking, there have been two types of theories that aim to rationalize political busi-
ness cycles: a theory that focuses on politicians’ “opportunistic manipulation” of voters and
a “partisan” theory that considers how differences in political parties’ policy preferences pro-
duce cycles. I now review each strand of literature in turn. Before doing so, it is important to
note that in all of the papers mentioned below, Pareto efficient policies do not exhibit cyclical
dynamics; hence, if the political economy friction that is introduced causes political cycles,
these cycles are inefficient.
Many models that contribute to the theoretical research on political business cycles are
motivated by the robust empirical observation that economic conditions before an election
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heavily influence voters’ decisions.2 Politicians will then, to the best of their ability, influence
the economy or other policy variables in an effort to be reelected. This is the basic observation
that motivates the literature on opportunistic manipulation.
One of the first models of opportunistic political cycles, developed by Nordhaus (1975),
considers an economy that is represented by a downward-sloping Phillips curve with (homoge-
nous) voters with (irrational) adaptive expectations. Given that voters prefer low inflation and
low unemployment, the office-seeking politician can secure reelection by depressing the econ-
omy for most of her term until right before the election, where the economy is stimulated with
expansionary monetary policy. The economy then follows a cyclical pattern with expansionary
policy right before the election and contractionary policy right after the election.
In an effort to model opportunistic political cycles with fully rational voters, Rogoff (1990),
along with much of the subsequent literature focusing on opportunistic manipulation, considers
a model based on an informational asymmetry between voters and the politician. More specif-
ically, Rogoff supposes that politicians differ in their competence, where highly competent
politicians can provide more public goods at a lower level of taxes. Moreover, an information
structure is assumed where (homogenous) voters are uninformed about one element of fiscal
policy but can perfectly monitor the politician with a one-period lag. In the first half of the
term policy is efficient, while in the second half of the term a competent politician sets taxes
too low and spending too high in order to communicate her ability. Hence, a political business
cycle may be generated due to a politician attempting to signal her private information.
Other papers of opportunistic manipulation based on signaling include Shi and Svensson
(2006), Martinez (2009), and Drazen and Eslava (2006). Shi and Svensson (2006) consider a
model similar to Rogoff’s, and find that the size of a pre-election spending boom, and hence
the political cycle, depends positively on the portion of “uninformed” voters and the ego-
rent collected by the politician.3 While Rogoff and Shi and Svensson assume an information
structure where voters are only uninformed at the end of the term—thus limiting the role
2See, for instance, Drazen (2000) and the references therein.
3They are ultimately concerned with an empirical study on how political cycles differ across developed and
developing countries and use the model to provide a theoretical explanation for some of their findings.
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of signaling to this time period—Martinez (2009) considers a political-agency model where
voters are imperfectly informed at all times and is able to show that politicians may have
a greater incentive to generate “good” economic conditions near the end of the term. In
contrast to these papers, Drazen and Eslava (2006) consider a model of voter manipulation
with heterogeneous voters that can view all aspects of fiscal policy and politicians that are
all equally “competent.” Voters are differentiated based on the types of government spending
they prefer and a politician has private information regarding her preferences over spending.
They show that there exists an equilibrium where there is a political cycle in the composition
of the budget, with higher targeted spending for the group of voters that is more likely to
swing the election.
Now, I consider papers on the partisan theory, where these models focus on how negotia-
tions amongst political parties with different policy preferences generate political cycles. Hibbs
(1977) presents one of the first partisan models. As in Nordhaus’s model, the economy is rep-
resented by a downward-sloping Phillips curve and voters do not have rational expectations.4
Two political parties have different preferences over inflation and unemployment, and due to
irrational expectations, the party in power can cause inflationary surprises. This implies that
cycles then arise in the economy, with fluctuations coming due to changes in which party is in
power.
Towards developing a partisan theory with fully rational agents, Alesina (1987) develops
a partisan model that focuses on cycles in macroeconomic outcomes, but allows for voters to
have rational expectations. In such a model, only unanticipated monetary policy can affect
real variables. Policy-making is modeled as a dynamic game of perfect information, where the
party currently in power chooses policy. The uncertainty caused by the election, coupled with
an assumption on the rigidity of nominal wage contracts, implies that there will be surprise
inflation at the beginning of a party’s term in power. There will then be the following cycle:
in the first part of the term, under the left-wing party policies will be relatively expansionary
while under the right-wing party policies will be relatively contractionary; in the second part
4Like Nordhaus’s model, it is assumed that voters have adaptive expectations.
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of the term parties implement the same policy.
Closely related to my paper are the recent papers by Dixit, Grossman, and Gul (2000) and
Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2010). Though not specifically models of political business
cycles, these papers consider the closely related question of how fluctuations in political power
may distort policy outcomes. Dixit, Grossman, and Gul consider a two-player game with
perfect information, where political power may change every period and changes in power
follow an exogenously given Markov process (as in my paper) with multiple degrees of political
power. As in my paper, political power takes the form of being able to allocate some surplus
each period, where, unlike in my paper, this size of this surplus is exogenously determined in
each period. Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2010) consider a n-player game with perfect
information, where, as in Dixit, Grossman, and Gul (2000), the party in power determines
the allocation of some surplus, political power may change every period and changes in power
follow an exogenously given Markov process (as in my paper). Besides considering a game
with more than two political parties, the main departure from Dixit, Grossman, and Gul is
the introduction of a production economy, where parties can exert productive efforts in order
to increase the size of the government budget. Hence, just as in my paper, the size of the
surplus that is allocated by the party in power is determined endogenously. Both papers study
the set of constrained efficient allocations and find that the sequence of constrained efficient
allocations is such that the current policy depends not only on which party is in power but
on how that party arrived to power. Dixit, Grossman and Gul also consider how voting rules,
such as majority or supermajority rule, affect constrained efficient allocations, while Acemoglu,
Golosov, and Tsyvinski consider how the frequency of power switches affect these allocations.
A fundamental difference between my paper and Alesina (1987), Dixit, Grossman, and Gul
(2000), and Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2010) is that I consider a game with imperfect
public monitoring. Drawing a direct comparison to Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2010),
when considering each party’s productive effort in each period, they assume this is public infor-
mation, while I assume that a party’s effort is unobservable to the other party. This assump-
tion changes the nature of constrained surplus-maximizing equilibria. One finding that emerges
from the models considered by Alesina and Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski, is that if parties
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are sufficiently patient (as I assume in my paper), in constrained surplus-maximizing equilib-
ria, policy distortions—and hence, political cycles—will vanish. Policy distortions (and any
associated political cycles) are therefore on the equilibrium path when considering inefficient
equilibria (i.e., equilibria that are not constrained efficient) or constrained surplus-maximizing
equilibria in a model where parties are impatient. In contrast, in my paper even when parties
are patient and play a constrained surplus-maximizing equilibrium, political cycles can arise
and are persistent.
1.3 The Model
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Let N = {1, 2} denotes the set of parties.
At each date, exactly one party is the party in power. Political power potentially changes
hands at the beginning of every odd period, where the evolution of political power follows
an exogenously given, time invariant, irreducible Markov process. For any period 2z, where
z ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, with party k ∈ N currently in power, let m(i | k) ∈ (0, 1) denote the probability
that party i is in power at the beginning of the next period.
At the beginning of each period t, there is income yt ∈ Y = {0, y}, where y > 0. I assume
there is zero income at the beginning of period 1. In period t, the party in power determines
the allocation of the income yt, denoted ct, where ct ∈ C(yt) = {c1t , c2t ∈ [0, yt]2 : c1t + c2t ≤ yt}.
After the income yt has been allocated, parties simultaneously choose actions, where party
i ∈ N chooses an action ai ∈ Ai = [0, 1].
The action profile a ∈ A = A1 × A2 affects r and pi, where r is a payoff vector and pi is
the probability distribution that stochastically determines the income level at the beginning
of the next period. Specifically, given the action profile a ∈ A, party i gets a payoff of ri(ai)
and the probability of obtaining the high income realization of y is pi(a), while the probability
of obtaining the low income realization of 0 is 1− pi(a).
The flow payoff for party i given the consumption allocation c and the action profile a is
ci + ri(ai). Parties discount payoffs using the common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
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Time t Time t+ 1
If t is odd,
power may shift
Income y
realized
Party in Power
chooses allocation
c ∈ C(y)
Parties
choose a
Figure 1.1: Timeline of Period t
The following assumptions on the payoff function r and the probability pi are made through-
out the entire paper.
Assumption 1 Given i ∈ N , ri(ai) = −ai for any ai ∈ Ai, and pi(·, a−i) is increasing in ai
for any a−i ∈ A−i.
Thus, higher actions give each party i a lower immediate payoff r, but generate higher
expected income in the future. Each party then faces a tradeoff when choosing an action:
lower actions generate a higher payoff today, while higher actions generate a higher expected
return tomorrow.
Assumption 2 pi is concave, differentiable and satisfies the following Inada conditions
lim
ai→0
∂pi(a1, a2)
∂ai
=∞ and lim
ai→1
∂pi(a1, a2)
∂ai
= 0 ∀aj ∈ [0, 1]
Assumption 2 implies that there are decreasing marginal returns to efforts at cooperation.
The differentiability of pi and the Inada conditions ensure that a simple set of first order
conditions can be used when characterizing the surplus-maximizing policies and the set of
surplus-maximizing equilibria.
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1.3.1 An Imperfect Monitoring Game
In what follows, I consider a stochastic game of imperfect public monitoring (see, for instance,
Fudenberg and Yamamoto, 2011, and Ho¨rner et al, 2011). Specifically, for any period t, while
the party in power kt ∈ N , the income realization yt ∈ Y , and the allocation decision c ∈ R2
are public information, the action ai ∈ Ai taken in any period t is private information for party
i ∈ N . The upcoming analysis also applies to the case where the action profile a ∈ A for any
period t is public information, with comparisons to this case being made occasionally below.
The public history at the beginning of period t is
ht = (k1, y1, (c11, c
2
1), . . . , kt−1, yt−1, (c
1
t−1, c
2
t−1), kt, yt).
The set of public histories at the beginning of period t is then Ht = (N×Y ×R2)t−1× (N×Y )
and H = ∪t≥1Ht denotes the set of all public histories. The private history for party i at the
beginning in period t is a sequence
hit = (k1, y1, (c
1
1, c
2
1), a
i
1, . . . , kt−1, yt−1, (c
1
t−1, c
2
t−1), a
i
t−1, kt, yt).
The set of private histories at the beginning of period t is then H it = Ht
⋃
(Ai)t−1 and H i =
∪t≥1H it denotes the set of all private histories.
A (behavior) strategy for party i is given by σi = {γi, ωi}, where γi : H i → ∪y∈Y ∆(C(y))
and ωi : H i → Ai. As parties utility is linear in consumption and pi is concave, it is without
loss of generality to limit attention to the set of pure actions Ai for each i ∈ N . Parties seek
to maximize the average discounted sum of their expected flow payoffs, where given the initial
party in power k1, initial income y1, and strategy profile σ, this payoff is
∞∑
t=1
(1− δ)δt−1Ek1,y1,σ[−ait + cit].
I only consider a special class of equilibria. A strategy σi for party i is public if it only
depends on the public histories H. A perfect public equilibrium (henceforth, PPE) is a profile
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of public strategies such that, for any period t and public history ht, σ|ht (the continuation
strategy induced by ht) is a Nash equilibrium from that period on. Note that the set of PPE
is a subset of the set of sequential equilibria.
1.4 Surplus-Maximizing Policies and Perfect Information
Before considering the (constrained) surplus-maximizing PPE of the imperfect monitoring
game, it is useful to consider both the surplus-maximizing polices and the (constrained)
surplus-maximizing equilibrium with perfect monitoring.
1.4.1 Surplus-Maximizing Policies
Given any state s′ ∈ S, the set of surplus-maximizing policies are characterized by considering
the following problem
max
{at,ct}∞t=1
Ek1,y1
∞∑
t=1
(1− δ)δt−1
[(
− a1t + c1t
)
+
(
− a2t + c2t
)]
,
where at ∈ A and ct ∈ C(yt). As this problem is stationary and parties’ utility from income is
linear, the action profile in any surplus-maximizing policy is time-invariant, i.e., a∗t = a∗t′ ≡ a∗
for any periods t and t′. The action profile a∗ is found by considering the action profile that
maximizes expected surplus over two periods. Formally, a∗ is the solution the problem
max
a∈[0,1]2
−a1 − a2 + δpi(a)y.
Given that pi is concave and differentiable, as pi is assumed to satisfy the Inada conditions
outlined in Assumption 2, the solution to this problem is characterized by the optimality
condition
−1 + δ ∂pi(a)
∂ai
y = 0 ∀i ∈ N.
Thus, in each period t, ait = a
i∗ where ai∗ satisfies the above optimality condition. As parties’
utility from income is linear, in any period t, in the event of a high income realization, any
allocation ct such that c1t +c
2
t = y is consistent with a surplus-maximizing policy. Note that the
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government budget is identical, in expectation, entering any period in any surplus-maximizing
policy. Hence, there are no political cycles in any surplus-maximizing policy.
1.4.2 (Constrained) Surplus-Maximizing Equilibria Under Perfect Informa-
tion
The following lemma establishes that, if parties are sufficiently patient and monitoring is
perfect, it is possible to construct an equilibrium that delivers the highest possible social
surplus of −a1∗ − a2∗ + δpi(a∗)y.
Lemma 1. Suppose monitoring is perfect. There exists a δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any δ ≥ δ¯
there is an equilibrium that sustains a surplus-maximizing policy.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If parties are sufficiently patient and monitoring is perfect, political cycles will only arise
on the equilibrium path in “bad” equilibria, where parties coordinate on an inefficient equilib-
rium. Hence, under perfect monitoring, cycles will only arise on the equilibrium path if parties
are “short-sighted” in a sense, whether it is due to parties simply being impatient or playing
an inefficient equilibrium where parties myopically optimize. In the next section, I consider
(constrained) surplus-maximizing equilibria under imperfect public monitoring and show that,
even when parties are not short-sighted in this sense, inefficient political cycles can arise on
the equilibrium path. This result therefore illustrates that even with political parties that aim
to maximize welfare when negotiating policy, political cycles emerge. As argued earlier, the
assumption of imperfect monitoring is consistent with the notion that the unobserved actions
that parties take during the political decision-making process, such as debating policies in pri-
vate meetings in order to find consensus amongst the party, often have important implications
on what policies are implemented.
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1.5 (Constrained) Surplus-Maximizing PPE Under Imperfect Monitoring
In this section, I consider (constrained) surplus-maximizing PPE and, more specifically, the
equilibria when parties are sufficiently patient. As illustrated in the previous section, if moni-
toring is perfect and if parties are sufficiently patient, it is possible to construct an equilibrium
that delivers the highest possible surplus. In contrast, with imperfect public monitoring, this
is not possible. The following lemma establishes that, regardless of how patient parties are,
the surplus from any (constrained) surplus-maximizing equilibrium is necessarily less than the
highest possible surplus.
Lemma 2. Given any δ ∈ (0, 1), the surplus from any (constrained) surplus-maximizing PPE
is strictly less than the surplus from any surplus-maximizing policy.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The rest of this section focuses on the strategies that deliver the (constrained) surplus-
maximizing PPE payoff. The argument used to analyze (constrained) surplus-maximizing
PPE, as parties become arbitrarily patient, is as follows. First, as a benchmark, consider
the set of equilibria where after the income realization at any date t, the expected surplus
from the equilibrium is independent of the income realization yt. It follows that, in these
equilibria, the expected surplus from the continuation payoffs in equilibrium is time-invariant
and these equilibria do not use “punishments.” Next, note that, if there do exist equilibria
that provide higher expected surplus than any of these equilibria without punishments, these
equilibria must involve punishments where the expected surplus from the continuation payoffs
falls in the event of a low income realization. Essentially, if a low income realization triggers
a punishment, where parties receive low payoffs, then, as the probability of getting a high
income realization is increasing in parties efforts, these equilibria will feature higher efforts
initially until the (inevitable) punishment is administered. When considering the form surplus-
maximizing equilibria may take, the following question then arises: is the expected surplus
higher if parties choose high efforts initially, with an eventual reversion to a punishment phase
with low payoffs, or is the surplus higher with (relatively) moderate efforts each period and no
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punishment?
The main result, Proposition 1, establishes that if parties efforts are complementary (in
the sense described in Assumption 3 below), then as parties become sufficiently patient, it is
always possible to construct an equilibrium with high initial efforts and a punishment phase,
that improves on any “no punishment” equilibrium. Hence, surplus-maximizing equilibria
require a punishment phase, and thus, as I will discuss shortly, political cycles.
I use the following assumption for some of the results stated in the rest of the paper.
Assumption 3 Suppose ai > aj . Then pi(ai, aj) < pi(ai−ε, aj+ε), where ε ∈ (0,min{ai, ai−
aj}).
Assumption 3 implies that the probability pi is symmetric and that parties efforts towards
cooperation are complements. The following lemma characterizes the benchmark equilibrium
discussed above that does not use punishments.
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 3,
1. There exists a δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any δ ≥ δ¯, there is an equilibrium where, in each
period t, each party i ∈ N chooses an action ait where
−1 + δ ∂pi(at)
∂ait
y
2
= 0;
2. This equilibrium generates the highest surplus amongst all equilibria that do not use
punishments.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The equilibrium characterized in Lemma 3 provides a lower bound on the surplus from any
(constrained) surplus-maximizing equilibrium. It is important to note that, in the equilibrium
in Lemma 3, the actions chosen each period are inefficiently low. Hence, in order to provide
incentives for higher, more efficient actions, a strategy must rely on punishments where the
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expected surplus from the continuation payoffs in the event of a high income realization is
strictly greater than the surplus in the event of a low income realization. In the main result,
Proposition 1, I show that, if δ is sufficiently large, then any (constrained) surplus-maximizing
equilibrium requires these higher actions initially.
Notation and Preliminaries. The following notation and terminology is used is some of
the results in the remainder of the paper. It is useful to introduce the following state space
S. Let T = {t1, t2} and S = N × T , where s ∈ S specifies the identity of the party in power
and whether it is the first part of the term (date t1 ) or the second part of the term (date t2).
Given a state s′ ∈ S at the beginning of the period, let p(s | s′) denote the probability that
state is s ∈ S at the beginning of the next period, where
• Given (j, t1) ∈ S, p(j, t2 | j, t1) = 1;
• Given (j, t2) ∈ S, p(i, t1 | j, t2) = m(i | j) for any j ∈ N .
Define party i’s minmax payoff for initial state s, initial income 0 and discount factor δ
vis = min
σ−i
max
σi
∞∑
t=1
(1− δ)δt−1Es,σ[−ait + cit].
As δ → 1, vis converges to party i’s limit-average minmax payoff with initial state s and income
0. (see Mertens and Neyman, 1981). As the Markov chain over S is irreducible, as δ → 1, vis
is independent of the initial state s (see, for instance, Dutta 1995).
Before stating Proposition 1, the following lemma characterizes the “worst” equilibrium
for each party i ∈ N , where in the worst equilibrium for party i, party i receives its minmax
payoff. These equilibria (or equilibrium if there is one equilibrium that gives each party its
minmax payoff) are used when constructing an equilibrium that gives higher surplus than any
“no punishment” equilibrium.
Lemma 4. Given an initial state s ∈ S, there exists a δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any δ ≥ δ¯ there
is an equilibrium with the payoff vector vˆs such that vˆis = v
i
s
16
Proof. See the Appendix.
The equilibrium constructed in Lemma 4 features a temporary phase of mutual minmaxing,
followed by a return to an equilibrium that gives each party i a payoff strictly higher then the
payoff vˆis. The behavior during the phase of mutual minmaxing can be described as follows.
The party in power takes all the income at the beginning of each period. In the first part of
the term, the party out of power j chooses the lowest possible action aj = 0, while the party
in power i chooses the action that solves
max
ai∈[0,1]
−ai + δpi(ai, 0)y.
In the second part of the term, both parties chooses the lowest possible action 0. Hence, there
are high frequency cyclical fluctuations during the phase of mutual minmaxing, as the size of
the government budget is, in expectation, smaller at the beginning of the first part of the term
than at the beginning of the second part of the term.
The statement of Proposition 1 relies on the following strategy. Consider Strategy SM :
• There are the following eight phases: Phases (As) and Phases (Bs). Transitions between
phases may only occur after the party-in-power’s allocation decision in a particular pe-
riod. Given an initial state s ∈ S at date 1, begin in Phase As.
• Given an initial state s ∈ S, in Phase As, the action profile a∗ is played. If in Phase As
and there is a positive income realization, each party receives y/2.
• If in Phase As′ and there is a high income realization, if the next state is s, move to
Phase As. If in Phase As′ and there is a low income realization, if the next state is s,
with probability ρs ∈ (0, 1) move to Phase As and with probability 1− ρs transition to
Phase Bs.
• If currently in Phase Bs and the previous phase was Phase As′ , with probability ξs
revert to the worst equilibrium for party 1 and with probability 1−ξs revert to the worst
equilibrium for party 2.
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• If currently in Phase As and there is a positive income realization, if the consumption
allocation cs 6= (y/2, y/2), revert to the worst equilibrium for the party currently in
power.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 3, there exists a δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any δ ≥ δ¯,
Strategy SM is an equilibrium that generates higher expected surplus than any “no punishment”
equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for the proof of Proposition 1 is as follows. The strategy featured in Proposi-
tion 1 (Strategy SM) begins with parties choosing an action profile that yields a higher social
surplus than the action profile in the benchmark equilibrium constructed in Lemma 3. If δ
is sufficiently large, then the transition probabilities (ρs) required for the action profile a∗ to
be incentive compatible get close to 1. Thus, the probability of transitioning to the punish-
ment phase becomes sufficiently small so that an equilibrium generates higher surplus than
the equilibrium constructed in Lemma 3 that does not rely on punishments.
It is important to note that without Assumption 3, the problem of characterizing (con-
strained) surplus-maximizing equilibria is less tractable. Essentially, if parties’ efforts towards
cooperation are not complementary and symmetric, it may be too costly to provide incentives
for both parties to choose high actions initially. Indeed, this may not be consistent with a
(constrained) surplus-maximizing equilibrium. Characterizing these equilibria then involves
comparing different “punishment” and “no punishment” equilibria, where it is not straightfor-
ward to determine which yield a greater expected surplus.
Proposition 1 illustrates that if efforts towards cooperation are complementary and sym-
metric, then surplus is maximized by a strategy where both parties are choosing high effort
initially, with an eventual (stochastic) reversion to a punishment phase where a bad equilib-
rium with low payoffs is played. Therefore, when joint efforts at budget growth are sufficiently
productive (as is the case with complementary efforts), then surplus-maximizing equilibria will
involve fluctuations with periods of time where the (expected) size of the budget is high and
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periods where the (expected) size of the budget is low. Furthermore, during a stretch of bad
policy where parties are minmaxing each other, recalling the worst equilibrium constructed in
Lemma 4, the equilibrium can display high frequency political cycles. In these political cycles
the (expected) size of the government budget is smaller at the beginning of the first part of
the term as compared to at the beginning of the second part of the term.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes a model of government policy-making where political business cycles arise
due to parties’ hidden actions, fluctuations in political power and differences in parties’ views
over the optimal allocation of the government budget. I suppose political parties have a
high discount factor and consider the set of constrained surplus-maximizing equilibria, where
the assumption that each party’s investment effort choice is unobservable generates a moral
hazard problem that has key implications on how close the payoffs from these equilibria are
to the Pareto frontier. Equilibrium payoffs are bounded away from the Pareto frontier. When
PPE payoffs are necessarily inefficient, if efforts toward bipartisanship are complementary,
constrained surplus-maximizing equilibria have cyclical dynamics. Hence, there are inefficient
political cycles on the equilibrium path.
My paper illustrates that inefficient political cycles can be consistent with constrained
surplus-maximizing equilibria. Hence, political cycles will not only arise with impatient polit-
ical parties, with parties that coordinate on a “bad” equilibrium, or with short-sighted parties
that only choose policies that are optimal from a short-run perspective. Essentially, politi-
cal cycles, through the association with a punishment phase where both parties receive low
payoffs, may be consistent with providing parties nontrivial intertemporal incentives that are
instrumental in sustaining political compromise.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Characterization of Minmax payoffs
The strategy profile that party j uses to minimize the other party i’s payoff is described as
follows.
• When out of power, j chooses aj = 0.
• When in power, in the first part of the term, party j chooses any action aj ∈ [0, 1] and
takes all the income that is realized at the beginning of the period.
• When in power, in the second part of the term, party j chooses aj = 0.
First, when in power, party j minimizes party i’s payoff by giving j none of any income
that is realized at the beginning of the period. In regards to party j’s action choice in the
first part of the term, as j will be in power in the next period, and thus can ensure that i will
receive an expected payoff of zero (regardless of what action profile is played in the first part
of the term), any action aj ∈ [0, 1] is consistent with j minmaxing i. When j is in power and
it is the second part of the term, or if j is not in power, j minimizes i’s payoff by choosing the
lowest possible effort aj = 0.
In response to this strategy, party i will find the following optimal
• When out of power, in the first part of the term, i chooses ai = 0.
• When out of power, in the second part of the term, i solves
max
ai∈[0,1]
−ai + δpi(0, ai)m(i | j)y.
• When in power, in the first part of term, take all the realized income and solve
max
ai∈[0,1]
−ai + δpi(0, ai)y.
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• When in power, in the second part of term, take all the realized income and solve
max
ai∈[0,1]
−ai + δpi(0, ai)m(i | i)y.
Given the strategy j uses to minimize i’s payoff, when out of power, in the first part of
the term, i knows that it will receive non of the income in the next period; hence, ai = 0 is
optimal. When out of power, in the second part of the term, considering that aj = 0 and the
probability of gaining power (and hence getting all the income) is m(j | i), party i solves the
problem outlined above. Similarly, when in power, in the second part of the term, considering
that aj = 0 and the probability of gaining power (and hence getting all the income) is m(i | i),
party i solves the problem outlined above. Finally, when in power, in the first part of the
term, considering that aj = 0 and the probability of gaining power (and hence getting all the
income) is 1, party i chooses the action outlined above. This strategy will yield the minmax
payoff vector.
1.7.2 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Let a∗ denote the action profile that maximizes social surplus. Consider the following strategy:
• Begin in Phase A.
• If in Phase A, the action profile a∗ is played and each party receives y/2 in the event of
a positive income realization.
• If ait 6= ai∗ or if ct 6= (y/2, y/2), with the party in power i, revert to the worst equilibrium
for party i; otherwise, remain in Phase A.
Define the payoff vector v as follows
vi∗s′ = −(1− δ)ai∗ + δ
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)
[
pi(a∗)
(
(1− δ)y
2
+ vi∗s
)
+ (1− pi(a∗)vi∗s
]
.
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In order for the action ai∗ to be consistent with equilibrium, given the state s′ ∈ S, the
following constraint must be satisfied
vi∗s′ ≥ −(1− δ)ai + δ
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)
[
pi(ai, aj∗)
(
(1− δ)c˜is + vis
)
+ (1− pi(a∗)vis
]
for each i ∈ N , any ai 6= ai∗ and c˜is = y if i is the party in power and c˜is = 0 is not the party
in power. Also, the allocation constraint for the party in power i
(1− δ)y
2
+ vi∗s ≥ (1− δ)y + vis.
As surplus under this strategy is maximized and, as δ → 1, v1s → v2s for any s ∈ S, if δ
is large enough, both the incentive constraint for actions and the party-in-power’s allocation
constrained are satisfied in each period t. Hence, there exists an equilibrium with payoff vector
v∗s in state s where v1∗s + v2∗s = −a1∗ − a2∗ + δpi(a∗)y.
Proof of Lemma 2
By contradiction. Suppose that the surplus-maximizing action profile a∗ can be supported in
each period. Then there exists continuations (ws(0), ws(y)) and allocations (cs) such that
ai∗ = arg max
ai∈[0,1]
−(1− δ)ai + δ
∑
s∈S
p(s |s′)
[
pi(a∗)
(
(1− δ)cis + wis(y)
)
+ (1− pi(a∗))wis(0)
This implies the following optimality conditions for i’s action
(1− δ) = δ
∑
s∈S
p(s |s′)∂pi(a
∗)
∂ai
[
(1− δ)cis + wis(y)− wis(0)
]
.
Noting that
δ
∂pi(a∗)
∂ai
y = 1
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and summing the two optimality conditions, we have
2(1− δ) = 1
y
∑
s∈S
p(s |s′)
[
(1− δ)y + w1s(y) + w2s(y)− (w1s(0) + w2s(0)
]
.
If a PPE existed that gave the same surplus as the surplus-maximizing policy, then w1s(y) +
w2s(y) = w
1
s(0) + w
2
s(0). Considering the condition immediately above, this implies
2(1− δ) = (1− δ)
giving the contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3
Part 1. Given the initial state s′ ∈ S, if party i finds it optimal to choose the ai in the
statement of the Lemma, then
−(1− δ) + δ ∂pi(a)
∂ai
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)
[
(1− δ)cis + wis(y)− wis(0)
]
= 0
where, as ∂pi(a)
∂ai
= 2yδ ,
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)
[
(1− δ)cis + wis(y)− wis(0)
]
= (1− δ)y
2
for each i ∈ N .
Note that the payoff vector vs′ satisfies the following for each i ∈ N
vis′ = −(1− δ)ai + δ
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)pi(a)
[
(1− δ)cis + wis(y)− wis(0)
]
+ δ
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)wis(0);
hence, using the equality immediately above, we have
vis′ = (1− δ)
[
− ai + pi(a)y
2
]
+ δ
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)wis(0).
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As each period a1 = a2 and each party i receives the flow payoff −ai + pi(a)y2 , it must be the
case that the equilibrium payoff, regardless of the income realization at the beginning of the
period, is
vis′ = −ai + δpi(a)
y
2
∀s′ ∈ S, i ∈ N.
This implies that cis = y/2 for any s ∈ S, i ∈ N .
In order to guarantee that this is an equilibrium, the allocation constraint for the party in
power i needs to be checked. With vis = v
i for each s ∈ S, given an initial state s ∈ S, this
allocation constraint is
(1− δ)y
2
+ vi ≥ (1− δ)y + vis.
First, note that, under Assumption 3, the surplus from the strategy outlined in Lemma 3 yields
an expected surplus that is strictly greater than the surplus v1s + v
2
s for any s ∈ S. Second,
v1 = v2 and v1s → v2s for any s ∈ S as δ → 1. These two pieces imply that if δ is large enough
then the allocation constraint is satisfied for any Markov process that satisfies the assumptions
outlined in The Model presented in Section 3. Hence, the strategy proposed in Lemma 3 is an
equilibrium for δ large enough.
Part 2. It remains to show that this equilibrium generates the highest expected surplus
amongst all equilibria that do not use punishments. The argument makes use of the following
lemma.
Lemma 5. Under Assumption 3, there exists a δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any δ ≥ δ¯, in any
constrained surplus-maximizing equilibrium both parties choose the same action in the first
period.
Proof. By contradiction. Fix a constrained surplus-maximizing equilibrium σ. Given the
initial state s′, suppose a is the action profile in the current period, where a1 6= a2, cs is the
consumption allocation in the next period if there is a positive income realization and the next
state is s ∈ S, and {ws(0), ws(y)} are the continuation values if the next state is s ∈ S. It is
important to note that for any constrained surplus-maximizing equilibrium where one party
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receives all the income in the event of a positive income realization, there is an alternative
equilibrium that delivers the same payoff and gives both parties positive consumption. With
this in mind, suppose cis ∈ (0, y) for each i ∈ N .
Without loss of generality, suppose a1 > a2. Consider the strategy σˆ, with the action
profile aˆ, with aˆ1 = a1−ε and aˆ2 = a2 +ε, where ε > 0 is very small. The consumption profile
(cˆs) will be defined below and the continuations {wˆs(0), wˆs(y)} are such that wˆs(0) = ws(0)
and wˆs(y) = ws(y) for each state s ∈ S.
Given the actions (aˆ1, aˆ2), for each s, I now show that there exists a consumption allocation
cˆs such that
− aˆi + δpi(aˆ)cˆis ≥ −ai + δpi(a)cis
for each i ∈ N . First, there exists a ε¯ > 0 such that for any ε ∈ (0, ε¯), there exists a cˆ1s ∈ (0, y)
where
−a1 + δpi(a)c1s = −aˆ1 + δpi(aˆ)cˆ1s.
Choose ε ∈ (0, ε¯) and such a cˆ1s. Noting that
− aˆ2 + δpi(aˆ)cˆ2s = −aˆ2 + δpi(aˆ)(y − cˆ1s)
we have
−aˆ2 + δpi(aˆ)cˆ2s = −aˆ2 + δpi(aˆ)y + ε− δpi(a)c1s
> −a2 + δpi(a)(y − c1s) (by Assumption 3)
= −a2 + δpi(a)c2s,
and we have established, under the action profile aˆ, there is a Pareto improvement. It remains
to show that the consumption allocation cˆs is incentive compatible for the party in power
for each s ∈ S. Noting that the allocation cs is incentive compatible and that cis ∈ (0, y)
for any i ∈ N , it follows that when ε > 0 is sufficiently small, for δ large cˆs will also be
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incentive compatible. Hence, if δ is sufficiently large, there exists an alternative equilibrium
σˆ that Pareto dominates σ. A repeated application of this argument establishes the desired
result.
Fix δ ∈ (0, 1) such that, under Assumption 3, in any constrained surplus-maximizing
equilibrium parties choose the same action profile. Towards a contradiction, suppose there
exists an equilibrium that does not use punishments with an action profile a′ 6= a, where a is
the action profile characterized in Part 1. The optimality condition for this action choice for
party i is
−(1− δ) + δ ∂pi(a)
∂ai
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)
[
(1− δ)cis + wis(y)− wis(0)
]
= 0.
As a1 = a2, under Assumption 3, adding these two optimality conditions and noting that
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)
[
w1s(y) + w
2
s(y)
]
=
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)
[
w1s(0) + w
2
s(0)
]
,
we obtain
δ
∂pi(a)
∂ai
(1− δ)y = 2(1− δ).
This implies that ∂pi(a)
∂ai
= 2yδ for each i ∈ N . Hence, parties choose the same action as outlined
in Part 1 and a contradiction is obtained. Therefore, for δ sufficiently large, the equilibrium
constructed in Part 1 offers the highest expected surplus amongst all equilibria that do not
use punishments.
Proof of Lemma 4
The proof of Lemma 5 relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Given δ ∈ (0, 1) and s ∈ S, there exists an equilibrium with payoff vector v such
that vis > v
i
s for any i ∈ N .
Proof. Consider the following equilibrium
• In any period, the party in power receives all the income in the event of a positive
realization.
26
• If party j is out of power and it is the first part of the term, party i chooses aj = 0.
• If party i is in power and it is the first part of the term, party i chooses an action that
solves
max
ai∈[0,1]
−ai + δpi(ai, 0)y.
• If party i is out of power and it is the second part of the term, party i chooses an action
that solves
max
aj∈[0,1]
−aj + δpi(ai, aj)m(j | i)y.
• If party i is out of power and it is the second part of the term, party i chooses an action
that solves
max
ai∈[0,1]
−ai + δpi(ai, aj)m(i | i)y.
Notice that the expected payoff that each party receives from the action choice in the first part
of each term is the same as the strategy that implements the minmax payoff profile. On the
other hand, the expected payoff that each party receives from the action choice in the second
part of the term is strictly greater than that received from the strategy that implements
the minmax payoff profile. Hence, under this equilibrium each party receives an expected
discounted payoff that is strictly greater than its minmax payoff.
Now for the proof of Lemma 5. Consider the following strategy, denoted σi, that generates
the payoff vector v
s
with vi
s
= vis.
• There are two phases: Phases A and B. Play starts in Phase A. In Phase B, the equilib-
rium constructed in Lemma 6 is played.
• In Phase A, the party in power receives all income in the event of a positive realization.
In the first part of the term, the party out of power j chooses aj = 0, while the party in
power chooses an action that solves
max
ai∈[0,1]
−ai + δpi(ai, 0)y.
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In the second part of the term, each party i ∈ N chooses ai = 0.
• If there is a low income realization in the second part of the term, with probability ρs
play shifts to Phase B while with probability 1 − ρs play remains in Phase A. If there
is a high income realization in the second part of the term, play remains in Phase A. In
the first part of the term, regardless of the income realization, play remains in Phase A.
First, let vˆs denote the payoff vector for the equilibrium constructed in Lemma 6. Second,
note that there always exists (ρs), where ρs ∈ (0, 1) for each s ∈ S, such that the strategy σi
generates exactly the payoff vis. Third, consider the action and allocation incentive constraints.
As the party in power simply takes all the income in the event of a positive realization, the
allocation constraint is always satisfied. In the first part of the term, as continuations are
independent of the income realization, the prescribed action profile is incentive compatible.
In the second part of the term, as each party’s payoff vˆis from the equilibrium in Lemma 6, is
strictly greater than the payoff vector vi
s
for any i ∈ N , if δ is large enough,
(1− δ)cis + ρs(vˆis − vis) < 0
for each i ∈ N . Hence, party i’s is decreasing in ai and ai = 0 for each i ∈ N is incentive
compatible. It follows that the proposed strategy is an equilibrium and, thus, there exists an
equilibrium that delivers the minmax payoff vis if δ is sufficiently large.
1.7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Let δ¯ be such that for any δ ≥ δ¯, any constrained surplus-maximizing equilibria has both
parties choosing the same action in the first period. Consider Strategy SM, where the surplus-
maximizing profile a∗ is played in the first period. The payoff vector vs′ from this strategy is
defined by
vis′ = −(1−δ)ai∗+δpi(a∗)
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)
[
(1−δ)cis+(1−ρs)(vis−vˆis)
]
+δ
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)
[
ρsv
i
s+(1−ρs)vˆis
]
,
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where (vˆs) is the payoff vector from the equilibrium outlined in Strategy SM where with
probability ξs the worst equilibrium for party 1 and with probability 1−ξs the worst equilibrium
for party 2. Note that there always exists a ξs ∈ (0, 1) such that vˆ1s = vˆ2s .
The optimality conditions required for the action profile a∗ to be incentive compatible are
δ
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)∂pi(a
∗)
∂ai
[
(1− δ)cis + (1− ρs)(vis − vˆis)
]
= (1− δ).
Noting that ∂pi(a
∗)
∂ai
= 1yδ and combining these conditions gives
vis′ = (1− δ)
[
− ai∗ + pi(a∗)y
]
+ δ
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)
[
ρsv
i
s + (1− ρs)vˆis
]
,
Noting that −a1∗ + pi(a∗)y = −a2∗ + pi(a∗)y, parties receives the same flow payoff during the
any reward phase. This, along with the result that vˆ1s = vˆ
2
s for any s ∈ S, implies that v1s = v2s
for any s ∈ S. This implies that cis = y/2 for any s ∈ S, i ∈ N . Substituting cis = y/2 and
∂pi(a∗)
∂ai
= 1yδ into the optimal conditions that must hold under a
∗, we obtain
∑
s∈S
p(s | s′)
[
(1− δ)y
2
+ (1− ρs)(vis − vˆis)
]
= (1− δ)y
where, as vˆ1s = vˆ
2
s and v
1
s = v
2
s for any s ∈ S, the two optimality conditions (one for each
party) reduce to one condition.
It must now established that there does exist a ρs ∈ (0, 1) for each s ∈ S such that the
single optimality condition for the action profile a∗ does hold. As vs, vˆs, and cs are each
independent of the state s, it is without loss of generality to consider a transition probability
ρ that is independent of the state.
Let vi ≡ vis and vˆi ≡ vˆis for any s ∈ S. Considering the single optimality condition above,
if exists a ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that
(1− ρ)(vi − vˆi) = (1− δ)y
2
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then the optimality condition above is satisfied. The payoff vector v is such that
vi =
(1− δ)
[
− ai∗ + δpi(a∗)y2
]
+ δ(1− pi(a∗))(1− ρ)vˆi
1− δpi(a∗)− δ(1− pi(a∗))ρ .
Let v˜ denote the payoff vector from the best no-punishment equilibrium constructed in Lemma
4. Noting that vi is increasing in ρ, with vi|ρ=1 > v˜
i and vi|ρ=0 < v˜
i, there exists a ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1)
such that vi|ρ=ρ¯ = v˜
i. It then follows that
vi − vˆi > vi|ρ=ρ¯ − vˆi = v˜i − vˆi ∀ρ ∈ (ρ¯, 1).
For each ρ ∈ (ρ¯, 1), there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) large enough such that
(1− ρ)(vi − vˆi) = (1− δ)y
2
.
This implies that there exists a δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any δ ≥ δ¯, there exists a ρ such that
(1−ρ)(vi− vˆi) = (1− δ)y2 with ρ ∈ (ρ¯, 1). Hence, if δ ≥ δ¯, then the single optimality condition
above for the action profile a∗ does hold.
Suppose δ ≥ δ¯. In order to establish that this strategy is indeed an equilibrium, it must
be checked that the allocation constraint for the party in power i is satisfied. Given the state
s ∈ S, this constraint is
(1− δ)y
2
+ ρsvis + (1− ρs)vˆis ≥ (1− δ)y + vis.
As ρsvis + (1 − ρs)vˆis > vis, there exists a δˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any δ ≥ δˆ, this allocation
constraint is always satisfied.
Take δ ≥ max{δ¯, δ¯, δˆ}. Then, if the sufficient condition is satisfied, the strategy stated in
the proposition is a surplus-maximizing equilibrium.
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2 Gridlocks, Extreme Policies and the Proximity of an Upcoming Election
2.1 Introduction
When considering democratic governments where policy decisions are made by a legislature,
such as the United States Congress or the British Parliament, it is often asserted that proposed
legislation, or lack thereof, depends on the proximity and expected outcome of an upcoming
election. Considering how an election ultimately affects policy outcomes before that election,
a few questions come to mind. When will policy negotiations end in a stalemate, giving
legislative gridlock? When will policy outcomes tend to be moderate or extreme? How does
the distribution of power amongst the political parties bargaining over policy influence policy
outcomes?
In this paper, I analyze these questions in a simple dynamic model of legislative policy-
making. The policy outcome at any date is a function of current political power, the proximity
of the next election, and the expected outcome of that election. The model offers predictions on
when delay in the policy-making process, interpreted as legislative gridlock, will occur and con-
siders when relatively moderate or extreme policy outcomes are likely. In addition to focusing
on how an upcoming election and other factors in the environment influence policy outcomes
at dates before an election, this paper also considers the welfare consequences associated with
various policy decisions.
The policy-making process is modeled as a perfect information, infinite-horizon bargaining
game. Two parties bargain over the allocation of the government budget, where a proposed
division of the budget is only implemented when both parties agree. If parties have not yet
agreed on an allocation of the budget, a party is randomly selected to propose an allocation.
At a single exogenous date T , the recognition process that determines which party proposes
policy at any given date may change, where this change is taken as given. In the model, the
ability to propose policy is one of the key determinants of “political power,” where a party with
high political power is more likely to successfully implement its preferred legislation. Hence,
at date T there is a shift in a factor instrumental to the distribution of political power in the
model. Consistent with the idea that elections bring shifts in political power, I would like to
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interpret the date T as an election date.
The government budget can be spent on indivisible public goods or distributed back to the
parties in the form of cash transfers. Parties disagree on which of two public goods projects is
optimal and, by assumption, the budget is not sufficient to finance both projects. At most, one
party’s preferred project will therefore be implemented when there is agreement. Furthermore,
it is assumed that each party would strictly prefer to implement its preferred project as opposed
to receiving a transfer worth the cost of the project. Indeed, it is the surplus generated by
implementing a project that fosters disagreement in the model.
As a benchmark, in any Pareto efficient outcome, there is immediate agreement and one
party’s preferred project is implemented. Hence, legislative gridlock is necessarily inefficient
in the model.
When considering policy outcomes after the “election” occurs at the beginning of date T ,
at each date t ≥ T there always exists at least one policy that both parties are willing to
accept. Thus, after the election date parties prefer implementing policy to legislative gridlock.
Given the expected policy outcomes at date T , I consider bargaining dynamics before date T ,
i.e., in the build up to the election date.
Equilibrium dynamics depend critically on the distribution of political power in the model.
If political power is sufficiently asymmetric, these dynamics take a simple form. There is
either agreement at each date t < T , or there are two phases, {1, . . . , tˆ} and {tˆ+ 1, . . . , T − 1},
where there is agreement at each date t ∈ {1, . . . , tˆ} and disagreement at each date t ∈
{tˆ+1, . . . , T −1}. The intuition for this result is fairly straightforward. Near the election date
T , as political power may change hands, parties may prefer to wait until after the election to
agree on a policy. As the time until the election increases, parties’ impatience dampens the
incentive to delay agreement until after the election, thus making a compromise feasible at
date tˆ. If political power is quite asymmetric, the party with low power expects a low payoff
from this agreement. This implies that this party is then easy to negotiate with at each date
t ≤ tˆ. Agreement is then feasible at each date t ≤ tˆ.
This line of reasoning suggests that, if political power is rather asymmetric, the policy
implemented at date tˆ will heavily favor the party with high power. Indeed, this is the case.
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This, in turn, preserves this party’s advantage, as if the party expects to receive a high payoff
tomorrow it can credibly demand its preferred policies today. It follows that, when political
power is sufficiently asymmetric, the policy implemented at each date t < tˆ will be relative
“extreme” in the sense that it generates a high payoff for the party with high political power,
while leaving the other party with very little.
Next, consider the length of disagreement spells before the election date T when the ex-
pected policy outcome immediately after the election generates high social surplus. Under
some mild restrictions on the parameters, if there are multiple spells of disagreement, and
hence multiple episodes of legislative gridlock, the longest disagreement interval will occur in
the dates immediately before the election. Hence, though it is possible for an interval of time
with legislative gridlock to occur at any point before the election, a relatively lengthy interval
of gridlock will only occur close to the election.
When the distribution of political power is fairly asymmetric, this distribution affects the
path of potential policy outcomes in an unsurprising way: the party with high power will
be able to successfully implement its preferred project more often; thus policies will be more
extreme and represent the preferences of the party with more political power. In contrast, when
bargaining power is symmetric, the path of potential policy outcomes becomes more volatile,
with potentially multiple transitions between intervals of time when agreement is feasible and
those when it is not.
The intuition for why the equilibrium may cycle between agreement and disagreement
“regimes” is as follows. Consider a period (tomorrow) where agreement is feasible, and fur-
thermore, agreement involves the implementation of a public goods project. In the period
before (today), if parties have an equal chance of being recognized to propose an allocation
of the budget and if a project generates a sufficient amount of surplus, then each party’s dis-
counted expected payoff at the beginning of the next period will be high, making agreement
today infeasible. Working backwards, as parties are assumed to be impatient, there will exist
a date where parties will be able to agree. The cycle will then repeat itself, as agreement
tomorrow implies that agreement today is impossible.
It is important to consider exactly why there are periods where agreement on a policy
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proposal is not feasible. Note that if the recognition process that determines which party
proposes policy at a given date remained fixed for the entire game, then agreement is feasible
in each period. Given the assumption that recognition probabilities change at some fixed date
T , agreement is also feasible in each period if there is enough room in the government budget to
fund both party’s preferred project, parties have the same preferences over public projects, or
perfectly divisible investments into public projects can be made. Thus, disagreement regarding
which public project is optimal, indivisible public goods, and the existence of a known date
where political power shifts combine to make disagreement feasible in equilibrium.
Broadly speaking, this paper is part of the literature that uses dynamic models to study
political decision making, and specifically, how changes in political power affect policy choices.1
While many papers explore the impact of electoral outcomes on policy-making, elections are
typically assumed to occur every period or every other period, thereby precluding the analysis
of policy-making between elections, where there are multiple periods in which parties can
negotiate policy. By allowing multiple policy-making periods before an election, I can analyze
how bargaining outcomes depend on an upcoming election date.
This paper is also related to a strand of literature that provides explanations for disagree-
ment and delays in agreement in bargaining situations that take place in perfect information
environments. A more in depth discussion of how this paper relates to this bargaining literature
is given in Section 5.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The model is introduced in Section
2. Section 3 considers the continuation values in equilibrium. In Section 4, the main results
regarding equilibrium dynamics are presented as well as some examples to illustrate what
dynamics can arise in equilibrium. Section 5 analyzes the related bargaining literature in
greater detail. Finally, Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains omitted details that are
used in the equilibrium analysis.
1See for instance Alesina (1988), Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998), Baron (1996),
Banks and Duggan (2000), Dixit et al. (2000), Eraslan and Merlo (2002), and Battaglini and Coate (2007).
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2.2 The Model
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Let N = {1, 2} denote the set of parties.
Parties meet to determine the allocation of a unit of income, where this income can be spent
on public goods, with any remaining income being divided between the parties.
There are two possible indivisible public goods projects, project 1 and project 2, where
party 1’s preferred project is 1 and party 2’s preferred project is 2. The cost of implementing
one project is c > 1/2; thus, only one project can be implemented. When parties reach an
agreement there are two possibilities: one, implement a project and divide the remaining 1− c
of income, or two, divide the unit of income. Let Z = {1, X(1− c)}⋃{2, X(1− c)}⋃{0, X(1)}
denote the set of potential policy outcomes, where “0” means that no project is implemented,
“j” means that project j ∈ {1, 2} is implemented, and X(y) = {(x1, x2) ∈ [0, y]2, x1 +x2 ≤ y},
with y ∈ {1− c, 1}
Each party i ∈ N cares about the project that is implemented and how much of the
remaining income she receives. Party i gets a payoff of θ from project i and a payoff of 0 from
project j 6= i. Given a division (x1, x2) ∈ X(y), with y ∈ {1− c, 1}, party i gets a payoff xi. I
assume that θ > c so implementing a public goods project creates a higher aggregate surplus
as opposed to implementing no project and dividing the unit of income. Let ui(z) denote the
flow payoff i receives from the policy z ∈ Z. Payoffs are discounted by the common discount
factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Let S denote a finite state space. Given s ∈ S, {p0(s), p1(s), p2(s)} are recognition proba-
bilities, with pk(s) ∈ [0, 1] for each k ∈ {0, 1, 2} and p0(s) + p1(s) + p2(s) = 1. The state can
only possibly transition at the very beginning of period T , where T > 1 is exogenously given.
Given the state s′ ∈ S, where s′ is the state for each date t < T , with probability ms ∈ (0, 1)
the state transitions from s′ to s, where s is then the state for each date t ≥ T . The state is
public information in each period.
Policy outcomes are determined by the following perfect information bargaining game. At
the beginning of each period t (after the potential state transitions if t = T ), if the parties have
not agreed yet, given the state s ∈ S, with probability pi(s) party i ∈ N is recognized to make a
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proposal and with probability p0(s) < 1 neither party is recognized to make a proposal. When
a party is recognized to make a proposal, the proposer makes an offer that specifies how the
unit of income will be spent. If the other party accepts the policy, parties receive the payoffs
from the policy and the game ends. If the other party rejects the policy, each party gets an
instantaneous utility of zero, and the game proceeds to period t+ 1. On the other hand, when
neither party is recognized to propose, each party gets an instantaneous utility of zero, and
the game proceeds to period t+ 1.
The history at the beginning of period t is ht = (s1, a1, . . . , st−1, at−1, st), where aτ , with
τ ≤ t−1, contains the following information: whether or not a party was recognized to make a
proposal in period τ , and if a party was recognized, the identity of the proposer; the proposal
that was made; and the vote cast by the party not proposing. Let Ht denote the set of all
such time t histories and H =
⋃
t≥1 Ht denote the set of all such histories. Let h
i
t denote a
history when it is party i’s turn to vote in period t, where hit lists the information in ht, the
identity of the proposer and the proposal. Let H it denote the set of all such time t histories
and H i =
⋃
t≥1 H
i
t denote the set of all such histories.
A (behavior) strategy for party i ∈ N is given by σi = {ri, vi}, where ri : H → ∆(Z)
and vi : H i → ∆({yes, no}). I only consider Markov perfect equilibria (henceforth, MPE), a
special class of subgame perfect equilibria. In the model, a Markov perfect equilibrium is a
profile of strategies σ that is a subgame perfect equilibrium and satisfies the following
• At any date t < T , the proposal only depends on the date t, the state, and the identity
of the proposer i, while party j’s, with j 6= i, vote only depends on the date t, the state,
the identity of the proposer, and the proposal;
• At any date t ≥ T , the proposal only depends on the state and the identity of the
proposer i, while party j’s vote depends only on the state, the identity of the proposer,
and the proposal.
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2.2.1 Remarks
A few features of the model deserve further attention. First, the assumption that in a given
state s ∈ S, with probability p0(s) neither party is recognized to propose policy captures
the idea that there are occasionally disturbances to the policy-making process that prevent
parties from meeting to negotiation policy. For instance, another issue may become of primary
importance, distracting parties from bargaining over the issue of initial concern, or a hostile
political climate may prevent fruitful discourse over the issue at hand.
Second, I do not allow both parties to commit to lotteries over which public good to
implement. Allowing such binding lotteries would facilitate compromise and affect some of the
results of the paper, particularly those pertaining to legislative gridlock. Essentially, depending
on the way that these binding lotteries are modeled, it is possible that there would no longer
be any legislative gridlock on the equilibrium path. The assumption to rule out these lotteries
captures the idea that often times political parties cannot commit to future policies.
Third, by limiting my attention to Markov perfect equilibria, I rule out equilibria that
may rely on history-dependent punishment strategies in order to enforce certain outcomes. It
should be noted that, if parties are sufficiently patient, it is possible to construct equilibria of
this form in the model.
2.2.2 Pareto Efficient Policies
First, in any Pareto efficient policy there is immediate agreement, whether the implemented
proposal involves the implementation of a project or not. Second, amongst the proposals
that involve immediate agreement, it is possible to have efficient policies that involve the
implementation of a project and efficient policies that do not. Note first that any policy
involving the implementation of a project is Pareto efficient. Now consider policies that do
not involve the implementation of a project. Any division (x1, x2) of the unit of income, where
x1 + x2 = 1, such that xi ∈ (1 − c, c) for all i ∈ N is Pareto efficient.2 This follows from the
assumption that θ > c. Observe that though there are policies involving divisions of the unit
2The interval (1− c, c) is nonempty due to the assumption that c > 1/2.
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of income that are Pareto efficient, as θ > c, policies involving the implementation of a project
always generate a higher aggregate surplus.
2.3 Continuation Values in a MPE
In this section, I characterize the continuation values for any MPE. When considering Propo-
sition 1 below, in a particular MPE, the proposals and acceptance rules at each date t ≥ T
will be identical. Hence, the continuations values, at each date t ≥ T will be identical and
will not be indexed by t. On the other hand, the continuation values at each date t < T will
typically depend on the date and will therefore be indexed by the date t. Before stating the
proposition, the follow notation and background is needed.
Preliminaries. Given the period t ≥ T and the state s ∈ S, let V i(s) denote the continuation
value for party i at the beginning of the period. Let the aggregate surplus be P (s) = V 1(s) +
V 2(s). Given the period t < T and the state s ∈ S, let V it (s) denote the continuation value
for party i at the beginning of period t. Let Pt(s) = V 1t (s) + V
2
t (s). In period T , let V
i
T (s) be
the continuation value after the state has transitioned to s ∈ S.
First, consider any date t ≥ T . Given state s ∈ S, let Ai(s) = {z ∈ Z : ui(z) ≥ δV i(s)}
denote the set of policies that party i is willing to accept. The set A(s) = A1(s) ∩ A2(s) is
then the set of policies that are acceptable to both parties. Though I do not allow parties
to commit to binding lotteries over which public good to implement, I do allow parties to
randomize over policy proposals when indifferent. Let pii(·; s) denote the probability measure
over the policy space Z that governs party i’s proposal decision. This probability measure
satisfies the following
• pii(·; s) has full support on the set arg maxz∈A(s) ui(z) if maxz∈A(s) ui(z) > δV i(s);
• pii(·; s) has full support on the set arg maxz∈A(s) ui(z) ∪ Z\Aj(s) if maxz∈A(s) ui(z) =
δV i(s);
• pii(·; s) has full support on Z\Aj(s) if maxz∈A(s) ui(z) < δV i(s) or if the set A(s) is
empty.
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These mixed-proposals can be described as follows. If maxz∈A(s) ui(z) > δV i(s), then there
exists at least one policy that party i can propose that will be accepted by party j and
that gives i a payoff strictly greater than its discounted continuation value. Hence, party i
will randomize over the set arg maxz∈A(s) ui(z). If maxz∈A(s) ui(z) = δV i(s), then party i
is indifferent between proposing a policy from the set arg maxz∈A(s) ui(z) and proposing a
policy that will surely be rejected by party j (i.e., proposing a policy from the set Z\Aj(s)),
where such a policy gives party i its discounted continuation value δV i(s). Thus, party i will
randomize over the set arg maxz∈A(s) ui(z) ∪ Z\Aj(s). Finally, if maxz∈A(s) ui(z) < δV i(s),
then party i strictly prefers to propose a policy that will surely be rejected by party j, where
such a proposal gives party i its discounted continuation value δV i(s). Party i will then
randomize over the set Z\Aj(s).
Second, suppose it is any date t < T . Given state s ∈ S, let Ait(s) = {z ∈ Z : ui(z) ≥
δV it+1(s)} denote the set of policies that party i is willing to accept. The set At(s) = A1t (s) ∩
A2t (s) is then the set of policies that are acceptable to both parties. Let pi
i
t(·; s) denote the
probability measure over Z that governs party i’s proposal decision. This probability measure
satisfies the following
• piit(·; s) has full support on the set arg maxz∈At(s) ui(z) if maxz∈At(s) ui(z) > δV it+1(s);
• piit(·; s) has full support on the set arg maxz∈At(s) ui(z) ∪Z\Ajt (s) if maxz∈At(s) ui(z) =
δV it+1(s);
• piit(·; s) has full support on Z\Ajt (s) if maxz∈At(s) ui(z) < δV it+1(s) or if the set At(s) is
empty.
The logic underlying the mixed proposals at any date t < T and the proposals at any date
t ≥ T is identical. The following proposition considers the continuation values in a particular
MPE.
Proposition 2. In any MPE, given the state s ∈ S, at each date t ≥ T the continuation value
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for party i ∈ N at the beginning of any period t ≥ T is
V i(s) = pi(s)
[ ∫
A(s)
ui(z) dpii(z; s) +
∫
Z\Aj(s)
δV i(s) dpii(z; s)
]
+ pj(s)
[ ∫
A(s)
ui(z) dpij(z; s) +
∫
Z\Ai(s)
δV j(s) dpij(z; s)
]
+ p0(s)δV i(s)
where j 6= i. The continuation value for party i ∈ N at the beginning of any period t < T is
V it (s) = p
i(s)
[ ∫
At(s)
ui(z) dpiit(z; s) +
∫
Z\Ajt (s)
δV it+1(s) dpi
i
t(z; s)
]
+ pj(s)
[ ∫
At(s)
ui(z) dpijt (z; s) +
∫
Z\Ait(s)
δV jt+1(s) dpi
j
t (z; s)
]
+ p0(s)δV it+1(s)
where j 6= i. Note that if t = T − 1, replace V it+1(s) for each i ∈ N with
∑
s′∈Sms′V
i(s′).
Proof. First, consider the continuation game that begins at date T , after the state has transi-
tioned. Consider why the continuation values as stated in the proposition are consistent with
a MPE. Given the continuations payoffs (V 1(s), V 2(s)), in equilibrium, party i will accept
any policy z ∈ Z such that ui(z) ≥ δV i(s). Given the continuations payoffs (V 1(s), V 2(s)),
in equilibrium, if maxz∈A(s) ui(z) > δV i(s), then the proposer i will randomize over the set
arg maxz∈A(s) ui(z); if maxz∈A(s) ui(z) = δV i(s), then the proposer i will randomize over
the set arg maxz∈A(s) ui(z) ∪ Z\Aj(s); and, if maxz∈A(s) ui(z) < δV i(s), then the proposer
i will find it optimal to propose a policy that will be rejected by party j, i.e., a policy in
Z\Aj(s). This argument implies that the probability measures (pi1(·; s), pi1(·; s)) are as stated
in the proposition. In a MPE, the proposals and acceptance rules just described must induce
the continuation values that are as stated in the proposition. Inspection of the continuations
values stated in the proposition confirms that these proposals and acceptance rules do induce
these values.
In order to complete this part of the proof, consider the following strategies. When party
i is not recognized to propose, she accepts any policy z ∈ Z such that ui(z) ≥ δV i(s). When
party i is recognized to propose, the proposed policy is governed by pii(· ; s). This strategy
implements the continuation values stated in the proposition and no party has an incentive
43
for a one-shot deviation; hence, this strategy is a MPE.
Now, consider the continuation values at each date t < T and check that they are consistent
with MPE. First, given a state s ∈ S, at each date t < T , the continuation values at the
beginning of period T (before the state transitions) are given by
∑
s′∈Sms′V
i(s′). Given these
continuation values, the MPE of the game is determined by backwards induction. For each date
t < T , given the continuation payoffs (V 1t+1(s), V
2
t+1(s)) (as stated in the proposition if t = T−1,
replace V it+1(s) for each i ∈ N with
∑
s′∈Sms′V
i(s′)), in equilibrium, party i will accept any
policy z ∈ Z such that ui(z) ≥ δV it+1(s). Given the continuations payoffs (V 1t+1(s), V 2t+1(s)),
in equilibrium, if maxz∈At(s) u
i(z) > δV it+1(s), then the proposer i will randomize over the
set arg maxz∈At(s) u
i(z); if maxz∈At(s) u
i(z) = δV it+1(s), then the proposer i will randomize
over the set arg maxz∈At(s) u
i(z) ∪ Z\Ajt (s); and, if maxz∈At(s) ui(z) < δV it+1(s), then the
proposer i will find it optimal to propose a policy that will be rejected by party j, i.e., a
policy in Z\Ajt (s). This argument implies that the probability measures (pi1t (·; s), pi1t (·; s)) are
as stated in the proposition. In a MPE, the proposals and acceptance rules just described
must induce continuation values at date t that are as stated in the proposition. Inspection of
the continuation values stated in the proposition confirms that these proposals and acceptance
rules do induce these values.
In order to complete this part of the proof, consider the following strategies. At date
t < T , when party i is not recognized to proposer, she accepts any policy z ∈ Z such that
ui(z) ≥ δV it+1(s). At date t, when party i is recognized to propose, the proposed policy
is governed by piit(· ; s). This strategy implements the continuation payoffs stated in the
proposition and no party has an incentive for a one-shot deviation; hence, this strategy is a
MPE.
Proposition 1 says nothing about the existence of a MPE. Notice that if there exists a
MPE in the continuation game beginning at date T , then there exists a MPE in the game.
Therefore, one starts by considering existence in the continuation game beginning at date T .
As the policy space Z is not convex, the probability measure pii(·; s) that governs proposals
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for party i is discontinuous in δV j(s).3 It is therefore not possible to establish existence of a
MPE by appealing to some of the standard fixed point arguments.
Fortunately, under certain parametric restrictions (see Condition D below), it is possible
to prove existence of a MPE in the continuation game beginning at date T by simply con-
structing an equilibrium. Though this is a limitation, as we cannot be sure if a MPE exists
in the continuation game, if Condition D is satisfied, then the necessary condition for the
existence of the MPE that are of primary interest in this paper—those where delay is possible
on the equilibrium path—is satisfied (Claim 1 below). The following proposition establishes
that under certain parametric restrictions, it is possible to construct MPE in the continuation
game beginning at date T . It makes use of the following condition
Condition D: In each state s ∈ S, suppose δ(1−p0(s))
1−δp0(s) (θ + 1− c) > 1.
Proposition 3. Under Condition D, there exists a MPE in the continuation game beginning at
date T (after the state has transitioned). Furthermore, given the state s ∈ S, suppose (without
loss of generality) that p1(s) ≥ p2(s). There always exists a MPE where both parties offer the
same project with strategies
• For party 1: when recognized to propose, offer project 1 and the division (x, 1− c− x) of
the remaining income of size 1− c; accept any offer z ∈ Z if u1(z) ≥ δV 1(s),
• For party 2: when recognized to propose, offer project 1 and the division (y, 1− c− y) of
the remaining income of size 1− c; accept an offer z ∈ Z if and only if u2(z) ≥ δV 2(s),
where the values x and y are uniquely determined given (δ, p(s), c, θ).
3Consider the proposal strategy pii(·; s) for party i, as a function of δV j(s). If δV j(s) ≤ 1 − c, then it can
be verified that it is optimal for party i to propose the policy “implement project 1 and offer party j the share
δV j(s) of the remaining 1− c if income” with probability one. If δV j(s) ∈ (1− c, c), then it can be verified that
it is optimal for party i to propose the policy “implement no project and offer party j the share δV j(s) of the
remaining unit of income” with probability one. Observe that pii(·; s) is discontinuous at δV j(s) = 1− c due to
the assumption θ > c.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, for the proof let i = 1 and j = 2. In the proposed MPE, the
continuation values at the beginning of any period t ≥ T are
V 1(s) = p1(s)(θ + x) + p2(s)(θ + y) + p0(s)δV 1(s)
V 2(s) = p1(s)(1− c− x) + p2(s)(1− c− y) + p0(s)δV 2(s),
where x, y ∈ [0, 1− c]; these equalities can be simplified to
V 1(s) =
p1(s)(θ + x) + p2(s)(θ + y)
1− δp0(s)
V 2(s) =
p1(s)(1− c− x) + p2(s)(1− c− y)
1− δp0(s) .
Note that the second equation implies 1 − c > δV 2(s); this implies, that in equilibrium x ∈
(0, 1− c] and 1− c− x = δV 2(s), as otherwise there exists a profitable deviation for party 1.
Also, note that θ+1−c > δV 1(s); this implies that in equilibrium either y = 0 and θ ≥ δV 1(s)
or y ∈ (0, 1− c) and θ + y = δV 1(s), as otherwise there exists a profitable deviation for party
2.
I now consider when y = 0 is consistent with equilibrium. In this case,
θ + x ≥ δV 1(s)|y=0, 1− c− x = δV 2(s)|y=0 and θ ≥ δV 1(s)|y=0, 1− c ≥ δV 2(s)|y=0;
notice that this set of equations reduces to θ ≥ δV 1(s)|y=0 and 1 − c − x = δV 2(s)|y=0, as
x ∈ (0, 1− c]. Expanding the equality 1− c− x = δV 2(s)|y=0, one has
1− c− x = δ
[p1(s)(1− c− x) + p2(s)(1− c)
1− δp0(s)
]
,
which gives
x =
(1− c)(1− δ)
1− δ(p0(s) + p1(s)) .
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Substituting this value for x into θ ≥ δV 1(s)|y=0, one has
θ ≥ δ
1− δp0(s)(1− p
0(s))θ +
δ
1− δp0(s)
[ (1− c)(1− δ)
1− δ(p0(s) + p1(s))
]
, (2.1)
where the right-hand side of (1) evaluated at p1(s) = 1 is δθ+ δ(1− c). Noting that V 1(s)|y=0
is increasing in p1(s), it follows that for each δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a p¯δ(s) ∈ [p2(s), 1] such
that for any p¯δ(s) ≥ p1(s), (1) is satisfied.
Given δ ∈ (0, 1), suppose p¯δ(s) ≥ p1(s). I now show that, under Condition D, the strategies
above with y = 0 are consistent with equilibrium. This is done by checking that there are no
profitable one-shot deviations. First, consider deviations to policies that implement project
2. As θ > 1 − c, party 1 will never deviate by proposing to implement project 2. If party 2
deviates by proposing to implement project 2, such an offer will not be accepted by party 1 if
δV 1(s) = δp
1(s)(θ+x)+δp2(s)θ
1−δp0(s) > 1− c. Notice that if δV 1(s) ≤ 1− c, then, as δV 2(s) ≤ 1− c,
δ(V 1(s) + V 2(s)) =
δ
1− δp0(s)
(
(1− p0)(θ + 1− c)
)
≤ 2(1− c) ≤ 1,
which contradicts Condition D. Hence, under Condition D, there are no one-shot deviations of
this kind. Second, consider deviations to policies involving no project, with parties agreeing
on a division of the unit of income. As θ > c, and 1 − c > δV 2(s), party 1 will not choose
such a deviation. As far as party 2 is concerned, if δP > 1, there does not exist a profitable
one-shot deviation for party 2; under Condition D, as δP = δ
1−δp0(s)
(
(1− p0)(θ+ 1− c)
)
> 1,
no such one-shot deviation is possible. Thus, the proposed strategies constitute an MPE.
Given δ ∈ (0, 1), suppose p1(s) > p¯δ(s). In this case y > 0. Note that for any y ∈ (0, 1− c)
there exists an x ∈ (0, 1 − c] such that 1 − c − x = δV 2(s). The value y is then chosen so
θ + y = δV 1(s); note that, as θ + 1− c > δV 1(s) and θ < δV 1(s), such a y ∈ (0, 1− y) always
exists. Using arguments analogous to the case with y = 0, under Condition D there are no
one-shot deviations and the proposed strategies constitute an equilibrium.
Though Proposition 2 establishes that, under Condition D, there always exists an equilib-
rium in the continuation game beginning at date T of the form described, it is also possible
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that there are multiple MPE in this continuation game.
Multiple MPE. In the following example, it is possible to construct three MPE in the
continuation game game beginning at date T . Suppose δ ∈ (2(1 − c), 1), the state s ∈ S
is such that p1(s) = p2(s) = 1/2 and Condition D is satisfied. First, there are MPE as
constructed in Proposition 2, with one MPE that implements project 1 each period and one
MPE that implements project 2 each period. Second, there is an MPE where parties agree
each period on a policy where no project is implemented and the unit of income is divided. It
is straightforward to verify that the continuation values are V 1(s) = V 2(s) = 1/2 and that the
following strategy is a MPE: when recognized to propose, a party offers δ 12 to the other party;
when not recognized to propose, accept i accepts any offer z ∈ Z where ui(z) ≥ δV i(s).
This example illustrates that it is possible for there to be multiple MPE in the continuation
game beginning at date T . This implies that when MPE exist they need not be unique. Hence,
continuation payoffs at any date may also not be unique.
2.4 Equilibrium Dynamics Before Date T
In this section, I consider equilibrium dynamics in the interval of time before date T and focus
on when it is possible for parties to agree on policy. As at the beginning of date T one primary
determinant of political power—the recognition probabilities—changes, this analysis considers
how dynamics before an “election” depend both on the proximity and the expected outcome
of that election.
Types of Agreement. In the event that there is agreement at date t < T , it is possible
to put additional structure on both proposals and continuations values at that date. Section
A.1 in the Appendix provides a formal characterization of the five possible types of agreement
and the proposals and continuation values in each of these phases of agreement. The five
types of agreement in a given period t < T can be described as follows, where, without loss of
generality, suppose δV 1t+1(s) ≥ δV 2t+1(s) given the state s ∈ S.
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In two of the five possible agreement scenarios (in the Appendix, Type 1 and 2 agreement),
parties agree on a proposal that implements project 1 regardless of which party is recognized
to propose. This occurs when the gap between parties’ discounted continuation values is
significant enough that the only type of policy that party 1 will accept is one that implements
her preferred project. As party 2 has such a small discounted continuation value, it will accept
and propose such a policy.
In another type of agreement (in the Appendix, Type 3 agreement), if recognized to pro-
pose, party 1 proposes a policy that implements project 1 and this is accepted by party 2.
If party 2 is recognized to propose, it proposes a policy that does not implement a project,
with parties instead dividing the unit of income, and this is accepted by party 1. This occurs
when party 2’s discounted continuation value is small, while party 1 has a relatively moderate
continuation value. As party 2 requires a small payoff from any policy, party 1 is able to
successfully implement its preferred project when recognized to propose. On the other hand,
as party 1 has a moderate continuation value, it will accept policies that do no implement
project 1, with agents dividing the unit of income. Party 2 finds it optimal to propose such a
policy.
In yet another type of agreement (in the Appendix, Type 4 agreement), regardless of which
party is recognized to propose, parties agree on a proposal where no project is implemented,
with parties dividing the unit of income. In this case, both parties have relatively moderate
discounted continuation values, and hence, either party will reject a policy that implements the
other party’s preferred project, as it provides too small of a payoff. Though it is not possible
to agree on a policy that implements a project, parties are willing to agree on a policy that
simply divides the unit of income.
Finally, in the last type of agreement (in the Appendix, Type 5 agreement), the party
that is recognized to propose offers a proposal that implements her preferred project and this
proposal is accepted by the other party. In this case, parties’ continuation values are so small
that they are each willing to accept a policy that implements the other party’s preferred project.
Agreement and Disagreement in MPE. Fix a MPE σ. At any date t < T , using the
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terminology in Yildiz (2003), there are two possibilities. First, there is an agreement regime in
σ at date t, if parties have not yet reached an agreement before date t, and as long as a party
is recognized to propose, at date t there will be agreement. Second, there is a disagreement
regime in σ at date t, if parties have not reached an agreement before date t, and regardless
of which (if any) party is recognized to propose, at date t there will be disagreement. Given
the state s ∈ S for each date t < T , if the following two conditions are satisfied at date t, then
there is a disagreement regime in σ at date t
1. δV it+1(s) > 1− c for all i ∈ N ;
2. δPt+1(s) = δ(V 1t+1(s) + V
2
t+1(s)) > 1.
If either of these two conditions does not hold, then there is an agreement regime in σ at date t.
This can be explained as follows. If δPt+1(s) ≤ 1, then it is always possible that parties agree on
a policy where no project is implemented, the proposer i offers party j exactly δV jt+1(s), which
will be accepted by party j, and the proposer i receives 1−δV it+1(s). As 1−δV it+1(s) ≥ δV it+1(s),
it is always possible that party i will make such a proposal, as opposed to proposing a policy
that will surely be reject by party j. Now, suppose that δPt+1(s) > 1. In this case, agreement
on any proposal where no project is implemented and parties agree on some division of the
unit of income is not possible. Instead, consider proposals involving the implementation of
project. If there exists a party i such that δV it+1(s) ≤ 1− c, then it is feasible for the parties
to agree on a proposal of the following form: project j 6= i is implemented, party i receives x
of the remaining 1− c of income and party j receive 1− c− x of this income.4
For each t < T , let P¯t denote the upper bound on the surplus in period t. Keeping in mind
that the surplus is maximized under a policy that implements a project, this upper bound is
defined recursively as follows. Given a state s ∈ S at each date t < T , the upper bound on the
expected surplus at the very beginning of period T is
P¯T ≡
∑
s′∈S
ms′
(1− p0(s′))
1− δp0(s′) (θ + 1− c)
4Suppose such a proposal was not feasible. Then δPt+1(s) > θ + 1− c and a contradiction obtains.
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The upper bound on the expected surplus at date T − 1 is then
P¯T−1(s) ≡ (1− p0(s))(θ + 1− c) + δp0(s)P¯T ; (2.2)
it follows that the upper bound on expected surplus at each t < T − 1 is
P¯t(s) ≡ (1− p0(s))(θ + 1− c) + δp0(s)P¯t+1. (2.3)
A necessary condition for the existence of a disagreement regime at date T −1 is then δP¯T > 1,
while a necessary condition for the existence of a disagreement regime at date t < T − 1 is
δP¯t+1(s) > 1. As θ > c, these conditions will be satisfied when the positive surplus generated by
implementing a project is sufficiently large, and the probability that neither party is recognized
to propose policy each period (p0(s)) is sufficiently small. Essentially, disagreement regimes
will only arise when projects are highly valuable and, in expectation, parties are able to make
policy proposals sufficiently often. Of course, parties must also be sufficiently patient.
The following claim verifies that if Condition D is satisfied, then a necessary condition for
the existence of a MPE where there are periods of disagreement before date T is satisfied.
Claim 1. Suppose Condition D is satisfied. Then δP¯T > 1 and δP¯t+1(s) > 1 for each t < T .
Proof. If Condition D is satisfied, then, for any s ∈ S,
1− p0(s)
1− δp0(s)δ(θ + 1− c) > 1.
As 1−p
0(s)
1−δp0(s) ≤ 1, this implies that δ(θ+1−c) > 1. It then follows that δP¯T > 1 and δP¯t+1(s) > 1
for each t < T .
When considering the dynamics exhibited by a particular MPE in the interval of time
before date T , given the pair of continuation values at the beginning of period T (before the
state transitions), determining proposals and acceptance rules at each date t < T amounts to
inducting backwards. In general, it is not clear in what periods there will be agreement regimes
and what exactly accepted proposals will be in each of these agreement regimes. The following
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lemma considers equilibrium dynamics when a party is able to implement her preferred project
in a given period, regardless of which party is recognized to propose.
Lemma 7. Let s ∈ S denote the state at each date t < T and suppose Condition D holds.
Fix a MPE where there is an agreement regime at date tˆ < T , and furthermore, regardless of
which party is recognized to propose, the proposed policy implements project k. Then, in this
MPE, there exists an agreement regime at each date t < tˆ, where, regardless of which party is
recognized to propose, the proposed policy implements project k
Proof. Consider date tˆ. If both parties j and k propose a policy (with probability one) that
implements project k, it must be the case that δV k
tˆ+1
(s) > c and δV j
tˆ+1
(s) ≤ 1 − c. Hence,
there is either Type 1 or Type 2 agreement (see the Appendix). It follows that continuation
values at the beginning of date tˆ are
V k
tˆ
(s) = pk(s)(θ + x) + pj(s)(θ + y) + p0(s)δV k
tˆ+1
(s)
V j
tˆ
(s) = pk(s)(1− c− x) + pj(s)(1− c− y) + p0(s)δV j
tˆ+1
(s),
where j 6= k and x, y ∈ [0, 1 − c]. Note that V j
tˆ
(s) ≤ 1 − c. I now show that δV k
tˆ
(s) > c.
Observe that V k
tˆ
(s) > (1−p0(s))θ+p0(s)c. Next, one can show that δ[(1−p0(s))θ+p0(s)c] > c.
Towards a contradiction, suppose otherwise. This implies δ(1−p
0(s))
1−δp0(s) θ ≤ c, and consider
1 <
δ(1− p0(s))
1− δp0(s) (θ + 1− c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Condition D
≤ c+ δ(1− p
0(s))
1− δp0(s) (1− c).
This implies
1 <
δ(1− p0(s))
1− δp0(s) ,
giving a contradiction. Thus, δV k
tˆ
(s) > c and V j
tˆ
(s) ≤ 1− c. It follows that proposals at date
tˆ− 1 will be as in period tˆ: both parties j and k propose a policy (with probability one) that
implements project k. When consider proposals at each date t ≤ tˆ− 1, an argument identical
to one used when considering period tˆ− 1 establishes the desired result.
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If a party i is able to implement her preferred project in a given period tˆ < T , regardless
of which party is actually proposing policy, this gives party i a high expected payoff at the
beginning of period tˆ. Under Condition D, party i will also be able to successfully implement
its preferred project at date tˆ−1. Essentially, if a party knows that it will receive a high payoff
tomorrow, it can credibly demand a high share today. It follows that party i will be able to
implement her preferred project at each date t < tˆ− 1.
The following proposition builds on Lemma 1 and illustrates how asymmetries in political
power influence equilibrium dynamics and allow for a fairly straightforward characterization
of when agreement regimes will occur. It is useful to note that, due to discounting, when T
is sufficiently large, in any MPE, there will exist a date t < T where there is an agreement
regime.
Proposition 4. Let s ∈ S denote the state at each date t < T and suppose Condition D
holds. Fix a MPE. Assuming T is large enough, let t1 < T denote the first date, counting
backwards from date T , where there is an agreement regime in this MPE. Given the surplus at
the beginning of period t1, denoted Pt1+1(s),
1. If δPt1+1(s) > 1, then there is an agreement regime in this MPE at each date t < t1 with
a project implemented in each period whenever some party is recognized to propose;
2. If δPt1+1(s) ≤ 1, then there exists a p¯(s) ∈ (0, 1) such that if p ≥ p¯(s), with p ∈
{p1(s), p2(s)}, there is an agreement regime in this MPE at each date t < t1 with a
project implemented in each period whenever some party is recognized to propose.
Proof. First, suppose δPt1+1(s) > 1. In this case, continuation values are such that δV
i
t1+1
(s) >
c and δV jt1+1(s) ≤ 1− c. Then there is either Type 1 or Type 2 agreement (see the Appendix)
and, if recognized to propose, either party will propose a policy that implements project i with
probability one. Lemma 1 then applies and the desired result is obtained.
Next, suppose δPt1+1(s) ≤ 1. Considering how continuation values are defined in Propo-
sition 1, there exists a p¯(s) ∈ (0, 1) such that if max{p1, p2} ≥ p¯(s), then at each date t ≤ t1,
min{δVt(s)1, δV 2t (s)} ≤ 1− c. It follows that there is agreement at each date t < t1.
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Proposition 3 demonstrates that if political power is sufficiently asymmetric then the path
of predicted policy outcomes takes a simple form. In a given MPE σ, if there is an interval of
disagreement, it occurs immediately before the election, and whenever there is an agreement
regime in σ at date t < t1, as long as some party is recognized to propose, the party with
higher political power will implement her preferred project. Hence, implemented policies at
dates before t1 are “extreme” in a sense.
It is useful to consider where political power in the time before date T comes from in
model. There are two primary determinants of a party’s political power. One, the recognition
probabilities at each date t < T . In any MPE, a party’s continuation value is nondecreasing in
its recognition probability. This follows from the fact that whenever a party is recognized to
propose, as parties are impatient, the recognized party is able to extract rents from the other
party. The second factor that affects a party’s political power are the continuation values
at the very beginning of date T , which depend on the recognition probabilities at each date
t ≥ T , and, if there are multiple MPE, the equilibrium that parties coordinate on. If there
are multiple MPE, these equilibria can be ranked according to the payoff each delivers to
a particular party. In short, equilibria can be “bad” or “good” from a party’s perspective.
Whether due to a party i having a high recognition probability or parties coordinating on a
MPE that gives party i a high payoff, these factors translate into i having a high continuation
value. This party then has high political power as it is able to successfully demand its preferred
policies.
The distribution of political power is instrumental in both part 1 and 2 of Proposition 3.
In part 1, if parties are willing to agree at date t1 with δPt1+1(s) > 1, it must be the case
that δV jt1+1(s) ≤ 1 − c and δV it1+1(s) > c; this only occurs when political power, arising from
the continuation values at the very beginning of date T , is sufficiently asymmetric. Notice
that, as parties have not agreed at any date t ∈ {t1 + 1, . . . , T − 1} (where this interval may
be empty), the current recognition probabilities have no impact on the continuation values
(δV 1t1+1(s), δV
2
t1+1
(s)). Due to Lemma 1, irrespective of the current recognition probabilities,
there is an agreement regime at each period t < t1, where party i is able to implement her
preferred project in each period, assuming some party has been recognized to propose. Hence,
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though current recognition probabilities may play a part in determining the shares of the 1− c
of income that remains after implementing a project, the continuation values at the beginning
of date T introduce the asymmetry in political power that is key for the result.
In part 2 of Proposition 3, the influence that the distribution of political power has on
agreement is more transparent: when there is agreement at date t1, if current recognition
probabilities are such that one party j has a very low chance of being recognized to propose
policy, then party j will have a low continuation value at the beginning of date t1, and at each
earlier date. If party j expects a low payoff tomorrow, then it is willing to agree on a policy
that gives it a low payoff today; this implies that there is an agreement regime at each date
t < t1 with party i able to implement its preferred project.
The proposition below considers the timing and duration of phases of legislative gridlock,
under the assumption that parties play a particular type of MPE in the continuation game
beginning at date T . Recall that, under Condition D, for any s′ ∈ S realized at the beginning
of period T , there exists a MPE of the continuation game beginning at date T where there is
an agreement regime each period t ≥ T with accepted policies implementing a project.
Proposition 5. Let s ∈ S denote the state at each date t < T . Suppose Condition D is
satisfied and for any s′ ∈ S realized at the beginning of period T , parties play a MPE in the
continuation game beginning at date T where a project is implemented whenever some party is
recognized to propose. Then, in this MPE,
1. There will be agreement at each date t < T , or a disagreement regime of the form
{tˆ, . . . , T}, with tˆ ≤ T − 1;
2. Assume p0(s′) = p0(s′′) for any s′, s′′ ∈ S. If there exists multiple phases of disagreement,
there will not exist a phase longer than the disagreement interval {tˆ, . . . T}.
Proof. First, consider part 1. Let s ∈ S denote the state at each date t < T . Given the
equilibrium parties play at each state s′ ∈ S in the continuation game beginning at date T ,
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the expected surplus at the very beginning of date T is
δ
∑
s′∈S
ms′PT (s) =
∑
s′∈S
ms′
[δ(1− p0(s′))
1− δp0(s′) (θ + 1− c)
]
> 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
By Condition D
.
Notice that if there exists an agreement regime at date T − 1, it must be the case that
δ
∑
s′∈S
ms′V
i
T (s
′) > c and δ
∑
s′∈S
ms′V
j
T (s
′) ≤ 1− c.
In this case, there is an agreement regime at date T − 1 and, regardless of which party is
recognized to propose, proposed policies implement party i’s preferred project (project i).
Arguments from Lemma 1 imply that δV iT−1 > c and δV
j
T−1 ≤ 1 − c, and thus there is
an agreement regime at date T − 2 and proposed policies implement project i. Inducting
backwards, it follows that, for each t < T − 2, δV it+1 > c and δV jt+1 ≤ 1− c, and thus there is
an agreement regime at date t and proposed policies implement project i.
If it not the case that δ
∑
s′∈Sms′V
i
T (s
′) > c and δ
∑
s′∈Sms′V
j
T (s
′) ≤ 1 − c, then there
is a disagreement regime at date T − 1. Depending on T and δ, there will either exist a
disagreement regime at each date t < T , or, if T is large enough, due to discounting, there will
exist a date 1 ≤ tˆ < T , where there is an agreement regime.
Next, consider part 2. Let t1 denote the first date, counting backwards from date T , where
there is an agreement regime. If δPt1+1(s) > 1, then δV
i
t1+1
(s) > c and δV it1+1(s) ≤ 1 − c
and there is either Type 1 or Type 2 agreement (see Appendix A.1). Just as argued above,
at date t1, regardless of which party is recognized to propose, proposed policies implement
party i’s preferred project (project i). Arguments from Lemma 1 imply that δV it1(s) > c and
δV jt1(s) ≤ 1 − c. Thus there is an agreement regime at date t1 − 1 and proposed policies
implement project i. Inducting backwards, it follows that, for each t < t1 − 1, δV it+1(s) > c
and δV jt+1(s) ≤ 1 − c, and thus there is an agreement regime at date t and proposed policies
implement project i. This implies that the only, and hence the longest, disagreement regime
occurs from date t1 + 1 to date T − 1.
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Now, suppose δPt1+1(s) ≤ 1. Note that the surplus at the beginning of date T is
PT =
∑
s′∈S
ms′
1− p0(s′)
1− δp0(s′)(θ + 1− c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 1
δ
Due to Condition D
.
The expected surplus at the beginning of date t1 is
Pt1 ≤ (1− p0(s))(θ + 1− c) + δp0(s)Pt1+1(s).
As
PT = (1− p0(s))(θ + 1− c) + p0(s) δPT︸︷︷︸
>1
,
it follows that Pt1(s) ≤ PT .
To complete the proof, consider the second agreement date t2 (counting backwards from
date T ) where there is an agreement regime. If δPt2+1(s) > 1, then using the same arguments
as above, there is agreement at each date t ≤ t2. As Pt1(s) ≤ PT , the (possibly empty)
disagreement interval from date t2 + 1 to date t < t1 is no longer than the disagreement
interval immediately before date T and one has the desired result. If δPt2+1(s) ≤ 1, then
as Pt1(s) ≤ PT , the disagreement interval from t2 + 1 to date t < t1 is shorter than the
disagreement interval immediately before date T . The expected surplus at the beginning of
date t2 is
Pt2(s) ≤ (1− p0(s))(θ + 1− c) + δp0(s)Pt2+1(s).
As
PT = (1− p0(s))(θ + 1− c) + p0(s) δPT︸︷︷︸
>1
,
it follows that Pt2(s) ≤ PT .
A repeated application of the same arguments establishes the desired result.
Recall that any policy that implements a project maximizes aggregate surplus. Thus,
when considering the equilibrium selection in Proposition 4, this proposition considers when
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disagreement regimes will arise when there is a common expectation that a policy that is highly
valuable to one party (as its preferred project is implemented) will be passed immediately after
the election. In other words, this proposition considers when disagreement regimes will arise in
an equilibrium where parties are “optimistic” regarding the policy outcome immediately after
the election. In such an equilibrium, though there may be multiple spells of disagreement, the
lengthiest period of legislative gridlock occurs right before the election. Essentially, once the
election is in relatively close proximity, the expectation of implementing a highly valuable policy
right after the election makes parties’ continuation values too high to allow for compromise.
Agreement is then infeasible at dates close to the election. The disagreement phase immediately
before the election is longest due to Condition D, the assumption that the probability that
no party is recognized to propose is state-invariant, and the focus on an equilibrium where
parties implements a project at date T . These conditions ensure that the expected aggregate
surplus for any policy outcome at date t < T is no more than the expected surplus from the
policy outcome at date T . This implies that an interval of disagreement building up towards
an agreement regime at some date t < T cannot be longer than the disagreement interval
before the agreement regime at date T .
There are many interesting cases that Propositions 3 and 4 do not cover. Though it is
difficult to completely characterize bargaining dynamics in general, it is possible to construct
different types of Markov perfect equilibria that illustrate what dynamics are feasible in the
model. Before considering the examples that show the various kinds of dynamics that are
consistent with MPE, it is important to note that, while Proposition 4 demonstrates that it is
possible to construct a MPE where there is a disagreement regime close to date T that gives
way to an agreement regime of length {1, . . . , tˆ} for tˆ < T , it is also possible to construct a
MPE where there are multiple transitions between agreement and disagreement regimes in the
time before date T . The following provides an illustration of why this can occur. Suppose
there is agreement at date t′ < T , where, if a party is recognized to propose, that party will
successfully implement her preferred project. Now, consider date t′−1. If parties are sufficiently
patient and parties’ recognition probabilities are not highly asymmetric, then there will exist
a disagreement regime at date t′− 1. Essentially, if there is common knowledge that there will
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be agreement at date t′, and furthermore, the proposer will be able to implement her preferred
project, then both parties’ continuation values at the beginning of period t′ are too large to
allow for agreement at date t′. Though there may be a disagreement regime at date t′ − 1, if
T is sufficiently large, due to discounting, there will be exist a date t′′ < t′ − 1 where there is
an agreement regime. It is therefore possible to transition back and forth from agreement and
disagreement regimes in a particular MPE.
2.4.1 Examples
The following examples aim to illustrate what dynamics are possible in equilibrium and how
the implemented policies depend on the proximity until date T , where a shift in the recognition
probabilities, and hence political power, may take place.
Examples 1 and 2 aim to illustrate how the MPE that parties coordinate on in the con-
tinuation game beginning at date T has implications both on the length of any disagreement
regime and the expected surplus P1(s0) at the beginning of the bargaining game. Example
3 shows how it is possible to cycle between agreement and disagreement regimes in the time
before date T . Example 4 illustrates, in contrast to Example 1, that it is possible for the
identity of the party with the highest continuation value to change with the proximity of the
election. Finally, Example 5 considers how the expected social surplus is affected by changes
in the parameters {θ, c, δ}.
In each of the examples, the state space S = {s0, s1, s2}, where in state s0 recognition
probabilities, with p ∈ [0, 1/2], are {p0(s0), p1(s0), p2(s0)} = {1 − 2p, p, p}, in state s1 recog-
nition probabilities are {p0(s0), p1(s0), p2(s0)} = {1 − 2p, 2p, 0}, and in state s2 recognition
probabilities are {p0(s0), p1(s0), p2(s0)} = {1− 2p, 0, 2p}. Therefore, in state s0 parties’ recog-
nition probabilities are equal and in state s1 (resp. state s2), whenever a party is recognized
to propose, it is party 1 (resp. party 2). Also, assume that Condition D is satisfied, where,
given these parameters, this condition is δ2p1−δ(1−2p)(θ + 1− c) > 1.
Given these parametric restrictions, before considering the dynamics in the time before T ,
consider the possible MPE in the continuation game beginning at date T . In state s1 (resp.
state s2) it is easy to show that there is a unique MPE where party 1 proposes a policy that
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implements project 1 (resp. project 2) and takes all of the 1 − c of income. Continuations
values are (V 1T (s0), V
2
T (s0)) = ((θ + 1− c)/(1− δ(1− 2p)), 0).
In state s0, there are multiple MPE. First, as Condition D is satisfied and p = p1(s0) =
p2(s0), there exists a MPE with strategies (henceforth, MPE E1)
• For party 1: when recognized to propose, offer project 1 and the division (x, 1− c−x) of
the remaining income of size 1− c; accept an offer z ∈ Z if and only if u1(z) ≥ δV 1(s0).
• For party 2: when recognized to propose, offer project 1 and the division (y, 1− c− y) of
the remaining income of size 1− c; accept an offer z ∈ Z if and only if u2(z) ≥ δV 2(s0).
and a MPE with strategies (henceforth, MPE E2)
• For party 1: when recognized to propose, offer project 2 and the division (1− c− y, y) of
the remaining income of size 1− c; accept an offer z ∈ Z if and only if u2(z) ≥ δV 2(s0);
• For party 2: when recognized to propose, offer project 2 and the division (1− c−x, x) of
the remaining income of size 1− c; accept an offer z ∈ Z if and only if u1(z) ≥ δV 1(s0).
where y = 0 and x = (1−δ)(1−c)1−δ(1−p) . Note that in each of these MPE there is an agreement regime
in each period t ≥ T . There may also be a MPE where no policy is implemented and parties
agree on a division of the unit of income (henceforth, MPE E0). In this MPE, parties use the
following strategies: if recognized to propose, party i offers 1−δ+δp1−δ(1−2p) ,while party j 6= i accepts
any offer z ∈ Z where uj(z) ≥ δV j(s0). In this MPE, there is an agreement regime at each
date t ≥ T . In order for these strategies to be consistent with equilibrium it must be the case
that, given (δ, p, c),
δV 1(s0) = δV 2(s0) =
δp
(1− δ(1− 2p)) > 1− c. (2.4)
Example 1
Suppose the state at each date t < T is s0 and consider the following parameters: T = 30,
δ = 0.90, θ = 2, c = 0.60, p = 0.45, ms1 = ms2 = 0.35, and ms0 = 0.30. Condition D and
inequality (4) are both satisfied; hence, in the continuation game beginning at date T , MPE
E0, E1, and E2 all exist.
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Figure 2.1: A Symmetric Model with MPE E0 Played at Date T
Examples 1 and 2 aim to illustrate how the MPE that parties coordinate on in the con-
tinuation game beginning at date T has implications both on the length of any disagreement
regime and the expected surplus P1(s0) at the beginning of the bargaining game.
Suppose that in the continuation game beginning at date T , if the state transitions to s0,
parties play MPE E0. Consider the equilibrium dynamics in Figure 1. Given the symmetry of
the example, with parties having the same recognition probability at each date t < T and the
same continuation value at the beginning of period T (before the state transitions), as Figure
1 (a) shows, parties have identical continuation values at each date t < T . Consider when
agreement takes place and on what policies parties are willing to agree on. Starting at date 1,
though parties are willing to agree, they are only able to strike a deal on policy that divides
the unit of income. Thus, no project is implemented. While such an agreement is Pareto
efficient, it clearly does not maximize aggregate surplus. As the election date T draws near,
the parties enter a disagreement regime until transitioning to an agreement regime at date T
for the remainder of the game. Notice that as in each period with probability 0.1 neither party
is recognized to make a proposal; therefore, the disagreement regime immediate before date T
is on the equilibrium path.
Due to discounting, it is clear that as the election date T becomes further away, there
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exists some date tˆ < T where parties are willing to agree. But why must parties only agree
on a division of the unit of income, with no project being implemented, at each date t ≤ tˆ
(with tˆ = 23)? As parties have the same continuation value at date tˆ + 1 < T , and these
continuation values are not too small, the only type of agreement that is feasible is one where
parties agree on a division of the unit of income. Given that parties have the same recognition
probability, continuation values are identical in period tˆ. If parties’ discount factor and the
probability that some party gets recognized to propose (2p = 0.90) are both sufficiently high,
then the continuation values (V 1
tˆ
(s0), V 2tˆ (s0)) are relatively moderate; specifically, for each
i ∈ N , δV i
tˆ
(s0) > 1 − c, with δPtˆ(s0) ≤ 1. This implies that, just as in period tˆ, in period
tˆ − 1 the only feasible type of agreement involves dividing the unit of income. An identical
argument implies that parties only agree on a division of the unit of income at each date t ≤ tˆ.
Example 2
Consider the same parameters as in Example 1. Suppose that in the continuation game
beginning in date T , if the state transitions to s0, instead of playing MPE E0, parties play
MPE E1. Consider the equilibrium dynamics in Figure 2. In this case, there is an asymmetry in
political power, relative to when parties play MPE E0, due to party 1 being able to implement
her preferred project with a higher likelihood immediately after the election. Starting at date
1, parties are able to agree, and furthermore, this agreement maximizes aggregate surplus, as
it involves implementing a project (specifically, project 1). Just as in the first case, as the
election date approaches, the parties enter a disagreement regime until transitioning to an
agreement regime at date T for the remainder of the game.
It may not be clear why party 1 is able to implement its preferred project, regardless of
which party is recognized to propose, during the agreement regime at dates {1, . . . , 20}. The
asymmetry created by parties coordinating on MPE E1 in the continuation game beginning
at date T with state s0, allows party 1 to implement her preferred project at date 21 when
recognized to propose. This creates a large asymmetry in continuation values at the beginning
of period 21, and hence, a political advantage for party 1. This asymmetry in political power
is preserved if parties’ discount factor and the probability that some party gets recognized to
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Figure 2.2: An Asymmetric Model with MPE E1 Played at Date T
propose (2p = 0.90) are both sufficiently high, despite the symmetric recognition probabilities
at each date t < T .
In comparison to Example 1, it is clear that the equilibrium that parties coordinate on in the
continuation game beginning at date T in state s0 has important welfare consequences. Plainly,
the MPE that parties play in this continuation game can cause asymmetries in political power
that influence equilibrium dynamics, and thus, the expected social surplus from the bargaining
game.
Before moving on to the next example, consider why, in both Examples 1 and 2, imme-
diately before the election there is an interval of time where there is disagreement in each
period. At date T , each party has a 35% chance of getting a recognition probability of 0.90,
and hence the political advantage. This increase in political power allows a party to implement
its preferred project, and thus, secure a high payoff. As the value of the project, relative to
the cost, is sufficiently great, parties’ continuation values at the beginning of period T (before
the state transitions) are too high to facilitate compromise. Hence, there is a disagreement
regime for multiple periods before the election. As the date T becomes further away, due to
discounting, continuations values decrease and parties are able to agree.
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Example 3
Suppose the state at each date t < T is s0 and consider the following parameters: T = 30,
δ = 0.90, θ = 2, c = 0.53, p = 0.45, ms1 = ms2 = 0.35 and ms0 = 0.30. Condition D is satisfied
but inequality (4) is not; hence, in the continuation game beginning at date T , MPE E0 does
not exist, while MPE E1 and E2 do.
Suppose that in the continuation game beginning at date T , if the state transitions to s0,
parties randomize over MPE E1 and E2. Specifically, parties play MPE E1 with probability 1/2
and MPE E2 with probability 1/2. As parties have the same recognition probability before date
T and the same continuation value at the beginning of period T , this example is symmetric.
Consider the equilibrium dynamics illustrated in Figure 3, which can be described as follows.
After a length of time where there is a disagreement regime, discounted continuation values are
small enough to allow agreement at date t′ < T , with this agreement taking place on a policy
that implements no project and divides the unit of income. As the cost of implementing a
project is relatively small, party i’s discounted continuation value δV it′(s0) ≤ 1−c for any i ∈ N .
When this is the case, the party that is recognized to propose can successfully implement its
preferred project (see Type 5 agreement in the Appendix). Hence, at date t′− 1, if recognized
to propose, a party will propose a policy that implements its preferred project, and this will be
accepted by the other party. This implies that each party will have a fairly high continuation
value at the beginning of period t′−1, which makes agreement at date t′−2 impossible. There
is then a disagreement regime for multiple periods before discounted continuation values are
small enough to allow agreement.
This example illustrates how it is possible to cycles between agreement and disagreement
regimes in the time before date T . Notice that at date 1, in this MPE, it is common knowledge
amongst the parties as to when the agreement regimes will arise. Furthermore, the timing of
agreement is determined endogenously by the proximity of the election date T . When con-
sidering the welfare implications associated with cycling between agreement and disagreement
regimes, though there is only one period of inefficient delay in this example, it is possible to
construct examples where there are multiple periods of costly delay at the beginning of the
64
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
t
 
 
V 1t , V
2
t
(a)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
t
 
 
Agreement Regime
Surplus Pt
(b)
Figure 2.3: Cycling Between Agreement and Disagreement Regimes
game.
In a particular MPE, whether there is cycling or not depends critically on the distribution of
political power and the cost of implementing a project. The cycling illustrated in this example
will only occur when there exists periods before date T where any party that is recognized
to propose will be able to implement her preferred project. As mentioned above, in order for
there to exist periods that satisfy this restriction, there must be periods T ′ ⊂ {1, . . . , T − 1}
where δV it+1(s0) ≤ 1− c for any i ∈ N , t ∈ T ′. Under Condition D, this only occurs when, as
in the MPE considered in this example, political power is symmetric and the cost is relatively
low. Figure 4 shows how if either of these properties are not satisfied, this cycling property
vanishes. Figure 4 (a) illustrates the path of expected surplus and when agreement regimes
arise when political power is asymmetric. Specifically, instead of parties randomizing with
equal probability over MPE E1 and MPE E2, parties coordinate on MPE E1 in the continuation
game that begins at date T . This gives an advantage to party 1. The rest of the parameters
are as stated above. Figure 4 (b) illustrates the path of expected surplus and when agreement
regimes arise with higher costs. Specifically, the cost is c = 0.65 instead of c = 0.53. The rest
of the parameters are as stated above, and, when considering the equilibrium played in the
continuation game beginning at date T , parties are still assumed to randomize over MPE E1
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Figure 2.4: No Cycling with Asymmetric Political Power or High Costs
and MPE E2 with equal probability.
Example 4
Suppose the state at each date t < T is s1 and consider the following parameters: T = 30,
δ = 0.90, θ = 2, c = 0.60, p = 0.45, ms1 = 0.35, ms2 = 0.55 and ms0 = 0.10. Condition D and
inequality (4) are both satisfied; hence, in the continuation game beginning at date T , MPE
E0, E1, and E2 all exist. Suppose parties play MPE E0 in the continuation game beginning
at date T . Also, notice that as p = 0.45 and the state at each date t < T is s1, at each date
t < T , party 1 is recognized to propose with probability 2p = 0.90, while with probability
1− 2p = 0.90, neither party is recognized.
This example illustrates, in contrast to Example 1, that it is possible for the identity of
the party with the highest continuation value to change with the proximity of the election.
Consider Figure 5. At dates close to the election date T , with m(s2 | s0) > m(s1 | s0), party 2
is more likely to grab proposal rights, and hence, be able to implement its preferred project.
This implies that at each date t ∈ {23, . . . , 29}, though there is a disagreement regime, party
2 has a higher continuation value tha party 1. As date T becomes farther away, the advantage
that party 1 has from having a much higher recognition probability at each date t < T begins
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Figure 2.5: A Shift in Political Power
to overwhelm the advantage that party 2 had close to the election. Party 1 is then able to
implement her preferred project at each date t < 19 giving her a higher continuation value,
compared to party 2, at each of these dates.
Example 5
This last example illustrates how the expected social surplus is affected by changes in the
parameters {θ, c, δ}. Consider the same parameters as in Example 1, except with the costs as
specified in Figure 6 (a) and (b). In the MPE illustrates in Figure 6 (a), it is assumed that in
the continuation game beginning at date T , if the state transitions to s0 parties play MPE E1.
In the MPE illustrated in Figure 6 (b), it is assumed that in the continuation game beginning
at date T , parties randomize over MPE E1 and E2, playing MPE E1 with probability 1/2 and
MPE E2 with probability 1/2.
First, consider how changes in the cost of the project c impact the expected social surplus.
The cost impacts this expected surplus in two ways: one, when the cost of a project increases
there is less surplus generated by any policy outcome; and two, when the cost of a project
changes, there are implications on what type of agreement is feasible, and either positive or
negative welfare consequences are possible. Hence, when considering an increase in the cost
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Figure 2.6: The Social Surplus with Different Costs
of a project, it is not entirely clear what the implications are on the expected social surplus.
Figure 6 (a) illustrates the rather unsurprising case where an increase in the cost of a project
leads to a decrease in the aggregate surplus. In contrast, Figure 6 (b) shows that it is possible
for the surplus to be nonmonotonic in the cost of a project.
Second, consider how changes in the discount factor δ or the value of the project θ impact
social surplus. While it is clear that an increase in the value of a project leads to an increase in
the surplus generated by any policy outcome, just as when considering changes to the cost of
a project, changes in both the value of a project and the discount factor may have ambiguous
welfare consequences. Indeed, it is possible to construct examples that demonstrate how the
expected surplus may be nonmonotonic in either the discount factor or the value of the project.
2.5 Relation to Previous Bargaining Papers
In this section, I consider the related papers from the bargaining literature. I start by discussing
two recent papers that offer results similar to those presented in this paper, though the driving
force behind these results is very different. Like my paper, one focus of Simsek and Yildiz
(2009) is on how the anticipation of a change at an exogenous date influences behavior in
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earlier periods. Therefore, their model also lends itself to the study of political decision-
making around election time. Briefly, they consider a continuous time bilateral bargaining
model, where the recognition process follows some stochastic process and each party may
have optimistic beliefs regarding her future bargaining power. If at some exogenous date
bargaining power becomes sufficiently “durable”—that is, the stochastic process governing the
distribution of power does not change very much—the probability of agreement is high around
that date. Hence, if bargaining power is expected to be durable right after an election date,
their model would offer predictions similar to my paper: agreement is difficult at dates close
to and before the election. Though the predictions are similar in spirit, the details of the
models are quite different, unsurprisingly producing disagreements through different channels.
In their paper, optimism about the stochastic recognition process and the characteristics of
that process produce disagreements; in my paper, where parties have a common prior regarding
the recognition process, limitations on the set of feasible policy decisions foster disagreements.
In both Simsek and Yildiz and my paper, changes in the recognition process are instrumental
in generating periods with disagreement.
Ali (2006) considers a bargaining model where it is possible for an equilibrium to have
a cyclical property with repeated transitions between dates when agreement is feasible and
dates where it is not. Ali considers a multilateral bargaining game, where parties may have
optimistic beliefs regarding the recognition process. If parties are sufficiently optimistic, then
the cycling result obtains. In Ali, the equilibrium dynamics arise due to each party holding
overly optimistic beliefs about the likelihood that she will be recognized to propose policy. In
contrast, in my paper, parties have a common expectation regarding the likelihood that each
party will be recognized. Cycling between agreement and disagreement regimes occurs in my
model due both to parties’ expectations regarding how the recognition process will fluctuate
in the future and constraints on the set of feasible policy decisions.
It must be noted that a number of bargaining papers provide different rationales for dis-
agreement and delay. The classic explanation for delays is due to asymmetric information
(Rubinstein, 1985; Admati and Perry, 1987; Kennan and Wilson, 1993). Essentially, delays
can be used to transmit information. a party may delay agreement to signal strength, or use
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delay as a screening device to determine whether the other player is weak or strong. A num-
ber of papers consider how delays may arise in environments with perfect information. This
literature therefore aims to provide an explanation for delays that complements those based
on asymmetric information. My paper is ultimately related to this strand of literature that
focuses on developing explanations for disagreement and delay in models with perfect infor-
mation. Regarding models with perfect information, delays may be produced if offers can be
made simultaneously (Perry and Reny, 1993; Sa´kovics, 1993), if the asset being bargained over
is stochastic (Avery and Zemsky, 1994; Merlo and Wilson, 1995; Eraslan and Merlo, 2002), or
if parties are optimistic due to the lack of common knowledge (Yildiz, 2003, 2004; Ali, 2006;
Simsek and Yildiz, 2009).
2.6 Conclusion
This paper studies when particular policy outcomes, such as stalemates in policy talks or the
implementation of centrist policies, will occur in relation to an approaching election date. I
consider a simple bargaining game played by two political parties, where the parties must
determine the allocation of the government budget, where this budget can be used to finance
only one of two public goods projects with the remainder redistributed to the parties.
I find that when political power is sufficiently asymmetric, at dates close to the upcoming
election date T it is most difficult for parties to reach agreement on a policy. Indeed, if there
is disagreement at any date t < T , then there must be a disagreement interval {t′, . . . , T − 1}.
Thus, legislative gridlock is more likely to occur immediately before the election. Furthermore,
when parties are “optimistic” about expected policy outcomes after the election, if gridlock
does occur before the election, the duration of these disagreement spells is longest right before
the election. If one party has significantly more political power that the other before date T ,
agreement at a date t¯ < T implies agreement at any earlier date t < t¯ and implemented policies
maximize aggregate surplus. Furthermore, as the gap T − t increases, at date t the party with
the political advantage is able to pass legislation that is more favorable to the party. On the
other hand, if political power is evenly distributed, then the path of policy outcomes before
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the elections becomes more volatile. In this situation, parties may agree on policies that do
not maximize social surplus and it is feasible for there to be long stretches of disagreement,
with cycling between agreement and disagreement phases.
The analysis may be relevant when considering negotiations in the United States Congress,
and in particular, two recent policy debates. The model suggests two reasons that, after a year
of negotiations with Republicans, the Democrats were able to pass a health care reform bill
in March of 2010: one, the Democrats possessed a significant advantage over the Republicans
in both the House of Representatives and the Senate; and two, the debate started well before
the next midterm election in 2010. Likewise, when considering the recent impasse over how
to handle the debt ceiling, the model suggests that it would be easier for Democrats and
Republicans to reach an agreement if the distribution of seats in the 112th US Congress was
less symmetric and if the next presidential election was far into the future.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Types of Agreement at Date t < T
In what follows, the dependence of the (V 1t+1, V
2
t+1) and (p
0, p1, p2) on the state at each date
t < T is suppressed. Also, if t = T −1, replace “V it+1(s)” for each i with
∑
s′∈Sm(s
′ | s)V iT (s′),
where again the dependence on the initial state s suppressed.
For t < T , given the continuations (V 1t+1, V
2
t+1), there are five types of agreement
• Type 1 Agreement. Suppose δV it+1 > θ and δV jt+1 ≤ 1− c. At date t, party i’s preferred
project is implemented regardless of which party is recognized to propose, if party i
is recognized to propose, she will offer party j exactly δV jt+1 of the income 1 − c that
remains, and if party j is recognized to propose, she will offer party i exactly δV it+1 − θ
of the income 1 − c that remains. Continuation values at the beginning of period t are
then
V it = p
i(θ + 1− c− δV jt+1) + pjδV it+1 + p0δV it+1
V jt = p
iδV jt+1 + p
j(1− c− (δV it+1 − θ)) + p0δV jt+1.
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• Type 2 Agreement. Suppose δV it+1 ∈ (c, θ], and δV jt+1 ≤ 1 − c. At date t, party i’s
preferred project is implemented regardless of which party is recognized to propose, if
party i is recognized to propose, she will offer party j exactly δV jt+1 of the income 1− c
that remains, and if party j is recognized to propose, she will offer party i none of the
income 1− c that remains. Continuation values at the beginning of period t are then
V it = p
i(θ + 1− c− δV jt+1) + pjθ + p0δV it+1
V jt = p
iδV jt+1 + p
j(1− c) + p0δV jt+1.
• Type 3 Agreement. Suppose δV it+1 ∈ (1− c, c], and δV jt+1 ≤ 1− c. First, suppose δV it+1 ∈
(1 − c, c). At date t, if party i is recognized to propose, she implements her preferred
project and offers party j exactly δV jt+1, and if party j is recognized to propose she
implements a division of the unit of income and offers party i exactly δV it+1. Continuation
values at the beginning of period t are then
V it = p
i(θ + 1− c− δV jt+1) + pjδV it+1 + p0δV it+1
V jt = p
iδV jt+1 + p
j(1− δV it+1) + p0δV jt+1.
Next, suppose δV it+1 = c. At date t, if party i is recognized to propose, she implements
her preferred project and offers party j exactly δV jt+1. If party j is recognized to propose,
she is indifferent between a policy that implements i’s preferred project and one that
does not. With probability αjt ∈ [0, 1] she offers a policy that implements i’s preferred
project and with probability 1 − αit she offers a policy with no project, and offers i the
share δV it+1 of the unit of income. Continuation values at the beginning of period t are
then
V it = p
i(θ + 1− c− δV jt+1) + pj [αitθ + (1− αit)δV it+1] + p0δV it+1
V jt = p
iδV jt+1 + p
j(1− δV it+1) + p0δV jt+1.
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• Type 4 Agreement. Suppose δV 1t+1, δV 2t+1 > 1− c, δSt+1 ≤ 1. At date t, parties agree on
a division of the unit if income, if party i is recognized she offers party j exactly δV jt+1,
and if party j is recognized she offers party i exactly δV it+1. Continuation values at the
beginning of period t are then
V it1 = p
i(1− δV jt+1) + pjδV it+1 + p0δV it+1
V jt1 = p
iδV jt+1 + p
j(1− δV it+1) + p0δV jt+1.
• Type 5 Agreement. Suppose δV 1t+1, δV 2t+1 ≤ 1 − c. At date t, if party i is recognized to
proposed she implements her preferred project and offers party j exactly δV jt+1 of the
remaining 1− c of income, and if party j is recognized to proposed she implements her
preferred project and offers party i exactly δV it+1 of the remaining 1− c of income.
V it = p
i(θ + 1− c− δV jt+1) + pjδV it+1 + p0δV it+1
V jt = p
iδV jt+1 + p
j(θ + 1− c− δV it+1) + p0δV jt+1.
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